

JPRS 72227

14 November 1978

NEAR
EAST

TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
No. 1866

NORTH
AFRICA

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

19980707 265

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

DTIC QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--|--|----------------------------------|--|--|
| BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET | | 1. Report No. JPRS 72227 | 2. | 3. Recipient's Accession No. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, No. 1866 | | 5. Report Date <u>14 November 1978</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. | | 8. Performing Organization Rept. No. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7. Author(s) | | 10. Project/Task/Work Unit No. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201 | | 11. Contract/Grant No. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above | | 13. Type of Report & Period Covered | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 14. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15. Supplementary Notes | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 16. Abstracts The serial report contains information on socio-economic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <table> <tbody> <tr> <td>Political Science</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-Arab Affairs</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Libya</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sultanate</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sociology</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> North African</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Mauritania</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> of Oman</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Economics</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Affairs</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Morocco</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Syria</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Culture (Social Sciences)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> People's Democratic Republic</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Tunisia</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ethnology</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Algeria</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> of Yemen</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Geography</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Bahrain</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Persian Gulf</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Western</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Technological</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Egypt</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Area</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Sahara</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Military Sciences</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iran</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Qatar</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yemen Arab Republic</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraq</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Israel</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Spanish North</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jordan</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Africa</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Kuwait</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sudan</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Lebanon</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | | | | Political Science | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-Arab Affairs | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Libya | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sultanate | Sociology | <input type="checkbox"/> North African | <input type="checkbox"/> Mauritania | <input type="checkbox"/> of Oman | Economics | <input type="checkbox"/> Affairs | <input type="checkbox"/> Morocco | <input type="checkbox"/> Syria | Culture (Social Sciences) | <input type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan | <input type="checkbox"/> People's Democratic Republic | <input type="checkbox"/> Tunisia | Ethnology | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Algeria | <input type="checkbox"/> of Yemen | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates | Geography | <input type="checkbox"/> Bahrain | <input type="checkbox"/> Persian Gulf | <input type="checkbox"/> Western | Technological | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Egypt | <input type="checkbox"/> Area | <input type="checkbox"/> Sahara | Military Sciences | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iran | <input type="checkbox"/> Qatar | <input type="checkbox"/> Yemen Arab Republic | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraq | <input type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia | | | <input type="checkbox"/> Israel | <input type="checkbox"/> Spanish North | | 17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jordan | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa | | | <input type="checkbox"/> Kuwait | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sudan | | | <input type="checkbox"/> Lebanon | | |
| Political Science | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-Arab Affairs | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Libya | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sultanate | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sociology | <input type="checkbox"/> North African | <input type="checkbox"/> Mauritania | <input type="checkbox"/> of Oman | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Economics | <input type="checkbox"/> Affairs | <input type="checkbox"/> Morocco | <input type="checkbox"/> Syria | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Culture (Social Sciences) | <input type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan | <input type="checkbox"/> People's Democratic Republic | <input type="checkbox"/> Tunisia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ethnology | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Algeria | <input type="checkbox"/> of Yemen | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Geography | <input type="checkbox"/> Bahrain | <input type="checkbox"/> Persian Gulf | <input type="checkbox"/> Western | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Technological | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Egypt | <input type="checkbox"/> Area | <input type="checkbox"/> Sahara | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Military Sciences | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iran | <input type="checkbox"/> Qatar | <input type="checkbox"/> Yemen Arab Republic | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraq | <input type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Israel | <input type="checkbox"/> Spanish North | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jordan | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Kuwait | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sudan | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Lebanon | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22151 | | 19. Security Class (This Report) <u>UNCLASSIFIED</u> | 21. No. of Pages <u>96</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 20. Security Class (This Page) <u>UNCLASSIFIED</u> | 22. Price | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

14 November 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

No. 1866

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Nabulus Mayor Urges Palestinian Unity To Foil Israeli Plans
 (Bassam al-Shak'ah Interview; AL-HURRIYAH, 28 Aug 78) 1

Lebanese Paper Contemplates Effects of Camp David Meeting
 (AL-HAWADITH, 13 Oct 78) 5

Briefs
 Iraqi Development Aid 10

ALGERIA

Algerian Finance Minister Addresses National Assembly on Budget
 (Editorial Report) 11

Briefs
 Soviet Ambassador Received 12

EGYPT

National Democratic Party Organizational Structure Announced
 ('Awatif al-Kailani, Sami Kamel; AL-AKHBAR, 11 Sep 78) ... 13

Population Control Program Shows Signs of Success
 (Salah Jalal; AL-AHRAM, 10 Sep 78) 16

Agricultural Crops Export Policy Formulated
 ('Ali al-Maghribi; AKHBAR AL-YAWM, 9 Sep 78) 23

Law Needed To Enable Farm Cooperatives To Function
 (Yusuf al-Qa'id; AL-MUSAWWAR, 20 Oct 78) 25

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

IRAN

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Pro-Shah Writer Expects Violence To End Soon (Antoine Matta; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 2 Sep 78) | 27 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|

IRAQ

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Capitalist System's Export of Inflation Deplored (Muhammad Hijazi; AL-THAWRAH, 18 Sep 78) | 37 |
| Land Transport Development Plans Reviewed ('Umran Rashid; AL-THAWRAH, 15 Sep 78) | 39 |
| Status of Nation's Textile Industry Discussed (Malik Mansur; AL-THAWRAH, 18 Sep 78) | 45 |
| Minister of Communications Describes Rural Phone System (AL-THAWRAH, 17 Sep 78) | 51 |

JORDAN

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| New Housing Brings Some Workers Back From Gulf (AL-DUSTUR, 23 Sep 78) | 53 |
| Southern Areas of Kingdom To Receive Electrical System (AL-DUSTUR, 21 Sep 78) | 56 |
| Project To Bring Reservoir Water to Amman Begun (AL-DUSTUR, 18 Sep 78) | 57 |
| Arab Mining Company Supports Industrial, Mining Projects (AL-DUSTUR, 17 Sep 78) | 60 |
| Arab Potash Company Opens Bidding for Project (AL-DUSTUR, 5 Oct 78) | 62 |

Briefs

| | |
|-----------------------------|----|
| Aqaba Shipping Traffic | 63 |
| Electric Power Generation | 63 |
| September Phosphate Exports | 63 |
| First Quarter Alia Revenues | 63 |
| Oil Refinery Production | 63 |
| July Money Supply | 64 |
| Commercial Bank Credits | 64 |

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

LIBYA

Advanced Arsenal Passes in Review
 (AL-DUSTUR, 11-17 Sep 78) 65

Oil Policy Aimed at Diversification
 (SAWT FILASTIN, Sep 78) 68

SUDAN

Sadiq al-Mahdi Discusses Reconciliation
 (SUNA BULLETIN, 5 Oct 78) 71

Sudan Joins Executive Committee of Security Organization
 (SUNA BULLETIN, 11 Oct 78) 72

European Economic Community Extends Loan
 (SUNA BULLETIN, 10 Oct 78) 73

Province Develops Traditional Agriculture
 (SUNA BULLETIN, 8 Oct 78) 74

Agricultural Production in South Detailed
 (B.A. Buttig; THE SUDAN STANDARD, 27 Sep 78) 75

Briefs

| | |
|--------------------------------|----|
| Al-Rusayris Dam | 79 |
| Tobacco Production | 79 |
| Tractor Imports | 79 |
| Investment Disputes Settlement | 79 |
| Oil Prospecting | 80 |
| Trade Protocol | 80 |
| Repatriation of Returnees | 80 |
| New Editor | 80 |
| River Transport | 81 |
| Refugee Identity Cards | 81 |
| New Factory in Al-Jazirah | 81 |
| New Road | 81 |
| New Water Supply | 81 |
| Agricultural Integration | 82 |

SULTANATE OF OMAN

Mideast 'Dynamic of Peace' Seen Gaining Momentum
 (LE MONDE, 27 Oct 78) 83

CONTENTS (Continued)

| | Page |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| UNITED ARAB EMIRATES | |
| Dubai Said Demanding Changes in Federal Constitution (Husayn Fathallah; SADA AL-USBU', 11 Jul 78) | 85 |
| Terrorist Carlos Expected To Enter Country in Next Two Days (AL-HADAF, 13 Jul 78) | 88 |
| New Federal Budget Analyzed; Cutbacks Noted (AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 22 Jul 78) | 89 |

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

NABULUS MAYOR URGES PALESTINIAN UNITY TO FOIL ISRAELI PLANS

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 28 Aug 78 p 25

[Interview with Bassam al-Shak'ah by Syrian AL-THAWRAH, reported by Sawsan Shannar: "Palestinian National Unity Is Basis and Starting Point"]

[Text] Bassam al-Shak'ah, the mayor of Nablus, has asserted that Palestinian national unity is the basis and the starting point for countering and standing fast in the face of the U.S.-Israeli-al-Sadat plotting and for foiling all the capitulationist plans in the area. He also asserted that what worries the masses of the occupied territories most in these days is the incitement of the spirit of inter-Palestinian fighting and hostility--a spirit which has surfaced in some Palestinian camps in Lebanon recently.

These statements were made in an interview conducted by the Syrian AL-THAWRAH with struggler Bassam al-Shak'ah, who is touring a number of Arab countries to get support for and strengthen the steadfastness of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and to collect donations to bolster the national projects of Nablus Municipality, especially the electricity project in which the municipality has achieved success and which the municipality has refused to link to the regional Israeli electricity network.

Unity of People, Unity of Revolution and Unity of Leadership

Concerning the suspect (Israeli-al-Sadat-Jordanian) attempts to create substitutes to the PLO as the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people, Bassam al-Shak'ah said that the masses of the occupied territories cling primarily to the unity of the Palestinian people within the concept of the unity of the issue and of the unity of the Palestinian people wherever they may exist within the framework and under the leadership of the PLO.

He added: All the attempts of Israel and of its supporters in the area have failed to create substitutes. As a result, the national blocs which believe in the principle of the people's revolution's and leadership's unity won the 1976 elections for the municipal councils.

Al-Sadat Initiative Paved Way for Self-Rule Plan

Al-Shak'ah also said: "Under the canopy of al-Sadat's capitulationist initiative, under the cracks and the collapse that this initiative has caused in the Arab front and the currents it has created in the Arab homeland, Israel is trying to outflank our people's struggle and their goals of getting rid of the hateful Israeli occupation and of returning to national independence. Israel is trying to do this by projecting the self-rule and the local administration plan in order to entrench the occupation."

Al-Shak'ah added: It is certain that the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories and all the representative national forces and councils reject the plot of the Menachem Begin plan (self-rule) and confront with all their strength the Israeli measures of annexation, merger, Judaization and settlement--all of which are exposed Zionist goals. The masses of the occupied territories also cling to the unity of the people and of their legitimate leadership, represented in the PLO.

Confronting Israeli Realities Is Basis

Concerning the Israeli attempts to create new realities in the occupied territories for the purpose of perpetuation and entrenchment of the Israeli occupation and of passing the self-rule plan through luring by the Israeli authorities of some elements known for their vacillating and rebellious positions, the mayor of Nablus said: Let us first admit that there are no disagreements inside Israel and that what is there is currents that flow in the same direction and toward the same goal. The difference is in the means only.

He added: Though the West Bank managed to wrench some rights through approval by the Israeli military authorities of some demands of the national establishments, especially the Nablus electricity and water project, the repatriation of Dr al-Natshah and permitting the entry of the donations collected by the municipalities, the masses of the occupied territories have not been deceived by all this because while some of the said demands have been approved, the Israeli occupation authorities have not concealed their adherence to the strict security measures against the national movements and against the struggle of our people which reflects the Palestinian people's adherence to their national and pan-Arab rights and to their human rights to their freedom to determine their future and to establish their independent state. Giving an example of the strict Israeli measures, al-Shak'ah cited the attempt to oust the mayor of Bayt Jala and three of his colleagues in the municipal council, the ban prohibiting the chairmen of the municipal councils from meeting together, dismissal of the Qabatiyah Municipal Council and appointing a different council, the attempts to create conflicts within the municipal councils and between the councils on the one hand and the municipal establishments in the cities on the other, tying facilitation of the tasks of the municipalities to obedience to the requests of the military authorities in one manner or another, the attempts to exert pressure on the mayors to adopt positions against certain municipal council members, as happened in Qalqilyah, not to

mention the wide-scale arrests and the attempts to project certain element in the establishments or individually in a manner compatible with the current Israeli plans and imposing a complete blackout on the positions and statements not compatible with these plans. All this is intended to codify life in the occupied territories in order to reach a certain reality that would serve Israel's plans to achieve the capitulationist settlement and, at the same time, that would bring success to the al-Sadat initiative, considering that this initiative projects a certain kind of relations to create a certain reality that is not at all compatible with the historical and human facts in the area and seeks primarily to outflank the Palestinian people's hopes and aspirations.

Maneuvers of Israel's Rulers Will Not Deceive Our People

As for what the Israeli occupation authorities circulate about differences between 'Ezer Weizman and Begin and other differences between the Likud, the Labor Party and the (Mi'rah) concerning the future of the Palestinian people's rights, al-Shak'ah said: We must first stress that the term "liberated lands," that the establishment of settlements, that the eviction of the population of entire Palestinian villages, as happened in the case of the demolition of the villages of 'Amwas, Bayt Nuba and Kharras, and the Judaization of Jerusalem are things that happened at the outset of the occupation and under the (Mi'rah). The difference between the Likud and the (Mi'rah) are differences in expression and in method only.

Despite what is being rumored about differences at present, no position has been taken against the establishment of settlements in the West Bank, even though the positions differ on the number, size and timing of the settlements. The outcome of all this is that even though statements have been made about the need to refrain from building new settlements at present as a tactic, other statements have been made on the need to expand the present settlements.

Currently there are measures to expand these settlements, to confiscate lands and to transform some of these lands into industrial and agricultural towns and villages. All this is a part of the strategic inclinations dictated by the Zionist interest. A reading of the facts and of the statements shows that all of Israel's rulers work within the framework of a certain interest, namely the interest of the Zionist movement. Every leader has his role in this policy.

Al'Shak'ah added: There may be competition as to who has the best and fittest means to protect the Israeli entity and the gains and victories Israel has accomplished at the expense of the Palestinian people in particular and the Arab people generally.

Arab Solidarity To Face Liquidationist Plans

As for the Arab solidarity which Saudi Arabia and Jordan advocate to rescue al-Sadat, al-Shak'ah said: There are two kinds of solidarity. There is solidarity behind al-Sadat's capitulationist policy, and this is rejected by the Palestinian people at home and abroad because it is plotting and not solidarity, and there is solidarity for the Arab cause and for the Palestinian national rights. This is the kind of solidarity we support and aspire to at home on the basis of clinging to the Palestinian rights and struggling for them and on the basis of standing with utter firmness against the conspiratorial solidarity that some people are educating to rescue al-Sadat and to pass the liquidationist solutions in the area.

National Unity Is Basis and Palestinian Inter-Fighting Serves Israel

Answering a question on Palestinian national unity and the attempt to incite the spirit of inter-Palestinian hostility and fighting, al-Shak'ah said: National unity is the guaranteed path for confrontation and for achieving our national goals. He added: Insofar as form and content are concerned, the unity of the Palestinian people at home and abroad relies on the background and the framework of the PLO. Israel is trying to sow division among us at home and abroad, among the factions and groups of the Palestinian revolution and between the Palestinian people and their legitimate leaderships in order to lead us to a state of despair built on exaggeration of the type that says "nothing scratches your back as well as your own fingernails." The Israeli authorities are finding some suspect circles to disseminate this despair, such as the suspect AL-QUDS which has been ceaselessly disseminating this feeling recently.

It is natural that this logic serves only the occupation authorities and their plans. The national demand of the masses of the occupied territories and of their national organizations is that the divisions existing in the revolution's ranks be settled by democratic dialogue and by returning to the PLO establishments through which our revolution and the struggle of our people at home and abroad can be safeguarded and through which progress can be made to achieve our people's national rights.

8494
CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

LEBANESE PAPER CONTEMPLATES EFFECTS OF CAMP DAVID MEETING

Beirut AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 13 Oct 78 pp 17-18

[Text] This time, things will not go as they have gone in the past. If a bloody incident against Egypt or the Egyptians does not take place during the coming days, and if a revolution does not occur somewhere in the Arab world during the 2 or 3 months which the Camp David agreements allowed for the completion of peace between Egypt and Israel, then the Arabs will face problems which had never occurred to them. I do not know whether anyone in the Arab world had thought till now of forming a committee to study the probabilities of the coming stage, for the consternation, bitterness, and agitation which the Camp David agreements aroused still forbid thinking about the most important event in the modern history of the Arabs during the past 60 years, since Lord Balfour made the promise to create a national state for the Jews in Palestine.

There are numerous problems which peace with Israel would raise, the least of which, for example, is having an Israeli embassy set up in Cairo, and there is no end to the list of them. How should the Saudi ambassador, the Kuwaiti ambassador, or any other Arab ambassador whose government has not recognized Israel and has not closed down its embassy in Cairo, as the Syrian, Lebanese, Algerian, Iraqi, Yemenite, and South Yemenite governments have done, behave? To say the least, should the Arab ambassadors who remain in Cairo meet the Israeli ambassador at official social functions, and should they exchange greetings with him?

It may be said that the Arab nations have faced such embarrassments as these in the UN meetings, and indeed in every country which has parallel relations with the Arabs and Israel, and the Arab diplomatic representatives have in most instances overcome the embarrassments and accustomed themselves to them, and so why should not the same thing happen in Cairo?

The answer is that Egypt is an Arab country, and those Arab states which have been content to object to the Camp David decisions without cutting off their relations with Egypt would be constrained to adopt another position after the signing of the peace with Israel.

What will this position be, then? Will they cut off their relations

with Egypt, and cut off their support, and join the Rejectionist Front? Or will they be forced to create a whole flanking movement and finish by supporting Egypt? If they joined the Rejectionist Front, they would themselves playing the Soviet card and losing themselves without gaining anything, but, if they supported Egypt, they would lose their place in the Arab world, especially since these "chosen" states have committed themselves to two causes, or perhaps we should say three, to wit, the Arabism of Jerusalem, the creation of the Palestinian state, and the refusal to recognize anything but the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole representative of the people of Palestine. There is no escape from this predicament except for the U.S. to exert pressure on Israel to yield on these issues, as well as on that of withdrawal from Golan. The question, then, is whether it is easier for the U.S. to exert pressure on Israel or on the petroleum-producing states, and how long the present situation of Egypt's support of the humiliation of the Palestinians and the purchase of their silence can endure.

When Dr Henry Kissinger was asked about the possibility of Jordan's joining Egypt and Israel around the conference table, he said, "Is there any other choice?"

From the U.S. point of view, there are only two choices: either Sadat's choice, which is peace with the conditions and agreements which were drawn up at Camp David, or the rejection not only of Camp David but of every U.S. solution. To put the matter more clearly, either the U.S. choice or the Soviet choice.

However, we must still consider the calculations of Jordan, whose opinion is that the application of the Camp David agreements means the elimination of Jordan and the role which was appointed for it to play. The slogan of "Goodbye to the Palestine Liberation Organization," which U.S. President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski coined, can also be applied to Jordan in the form of "Goodbye to King Husayn", for, if the trend is toward the possibility of creating a Palestinian state, even 5 years hence, King Husayn will not be the nominee for the leadership of that state. The slogan of "We shall never return to Jordan!", which the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip raised after the alaughter of Black September, is still to be heard and has not been discarded yet. As to whether the desideratum is merely Jordanian supervision over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for 5 years, and the affixation of King Husayn's seal on the decisions which the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the local inhabitants agree on, why should he consent to being burned in this furnace for nothing? Alternatively, if the plan which was prepared at Camp David was to depend on the Palestinian moderates to administer the Palestinian self-government both during and after the transitional period, then what need would there be for King Husayn's role? Does not President al-Sadat's statement mean that the negotiations on the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will go on with or without King Husayn, and that Jordan's

role has come to an end, at least in the Palestine issue? If we suppose that King Husayn should embark on the risk of negotiating over the Palestinians in response to the U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli invitation, would the Palestinians accept it? Has he not found himself faced with the Arab charge which was brought against al-Sadat because he went against the decisions of the Rabat Conference, which consider the Palestine Liberation Organization the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians?

The experts who specialize in understanding the mentality of King Husayn -- considering that the Jordanian king is a singular political phenomenon in the modern history of the Arabs -- say that Jordan, its system of government, and its king have no interest in taking the risks and confronting the Rejectionist forces, which are in possession of the street and in control of the passions of the mobs, in having Anwar al-Sadat negotiate over the Palestinians, or in having Begin and Carter cooperate to pacify the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the advantages of Arab-Israeli coexistence. Then, if the experiment should succeed and the Palestinian entity should appear, and it was established that self-government is a step toward the creation of the Palestinian state, Jordan would be ready to enter into a federal or confederate union which the Palestinians themselves would choose without any attempt at pressure, enticement, or constraint.

These Husaynologists go on to say, "This is not the first time that King Husayn has found himself up against a stone wall and jumped off the stage and surprised the observers with a new role, for the king is the foremost of the Arab heads of state in exercising the well-known British equilibrium in international policy, which is, 'No permanent friendship, and no permanent enmity, but always interests!' He used to plunge into conflicts with 'Abd-al-Nasir to the last ditch, and then, if it seemed to him that he was about to lose, he would open an avenue to him and jump from the position of enmity to that of alliance more swiftly than lightning. And now he is opening not merely avenues to Syria, Libya, and the Palestinians, but agreements with them, and he will never, never hesitate to turn the open line to Moscow into a tunnel!"

Syria remains the lock and key, and, so far, in spite of the reflections, maneuvers, and blows at the belt and beneath it, the odds are still on President Hafiz al-Asad, for the Americans, like the Soviets, and like all international powers which practice political action by calculation rather than by impulse, are pleased with Hafiz al-Asad. All sides are still betting on the role that he plays in the area, and his latest attempt to revive the Damascus-'Amman-Riyad-Kuwait axis is just an indication of his fitness for continuing the important role that he has begun to play since the signing of the Sinai agreement in 1975.

What will the Syrian role lead to? Will Hafiz al-Asad succeed in obtaining from the U.S. the rights of the Palestinians and the Israeli

withdrawal from Golan through the strength of the axis which he revitalized and which holds the strings of the U.S. strategy by guaranteeing the continuation of the flow of petroleum?

There is a conviction among the strategic analysts that much water will flow in the rivers of the Middle East before the result is known. During the transitional period, in which all kinds of weapons will be used, the Arab division will continue, and the attrition by weapons will continue. If the present Arab climate continues, the peace between Israel and Egypt may turn into an alliance and the cooperation between Cairo and Tel Aviv may proceed overtly, and what President al-Asad indicated may come true, i.e., that Israel and Egypt will engage in a direct military assault on Syria, or more probably on Libya, and then the area will fall into the pitfall of polarization and be divided into a pro-U.S. bloc and a pro-Soviet bloc. However, this is not the old idea [of polarization] that was held in the latter part of 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime, with the strongest Arabs and the Soviet Union on one side and Israel and the U.S. on the other, but this time it is the idea of Egypt, with all the weight that it carries in the Arab world, on the side of Israel and the U.S.

The question is, "Will the rich and sensitive Middle East area, which constitutes the basis of the strategic security of the U.S., be prepared to accept such eventualities as this?" Will the Soviet Union suffer al-Qadhdhafi to strike after Libya has become its manifest share in the area? Will Washington permit Israel to strike at the Saudi base of Tabuk if Israel decides to direct sudden blows at those who reject making peace with it?

Another contrary question is, "If the U.S. moves in some fashion and responds to the Saudi, Syrian, and Palestinian demands, and Damascus enters into the peace agreements with Israel, then what are the distinguishing features of the new world which would enter into the Arab world? In what form will the promised peace be? Will it be in the form of the frightening picture that some imagine, the rise of an Israeli empire that will rule over the Arab world, or will it be in the form of the splendid picture that the partisans of Arab-Israeli cooperation paint and which King Husayn summarized in his statement to NEWSWEEK 10 months ago, saying, 'There will be a marriage between Arab wealth and Jewish technology.'?"?

Those who are inclined to believe that Israel will behave as a great nation in the area say, "Israel will continue to endure the problem of 3 million Jews living among 150 million Arabs, and Egypt, with 40 million people on its border, will endure a similar problem." Egypt's assistance in solving its economic and human problems will make it a great nation. History tells us that, whenever a major political development has occurred in Egypt, it has always been concerned with Egypt's northern border in Palestine. Therefore, it is in Israel's

interest to have Egypt remain backward and bogged down in its problems so that Israel may survive and flourish.

As for those who speak of a marriage of Israeli technology with Arab wealth, they rely on the assumption that the world powers will never leave the Middle East to Israel alone and that the Arabs, especially those who possess petroleum and wealth, can maintain a continual balance between Israel's ambitions and the interests of the major powers, and therefore it will be in Israel's interest to behave wisely, at least in the transitional period during which the Rejectionist Front continues, for the projects which the Jews say are ready, such as setting up an atomic factory in Sinai to turn the deserts into gardens, creating joint tourism industries, building superhighways to usher the area into the age of progress, and opening a canal between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea, are necessary for the sake of establishing the advantages which the Arabs can reap from cooperation with Israel.

It is important to bear in mind that all these dangers, eventualities, and problems which the Camp David agreements have raised deserve more than a committee to study how likely they are to happen. The eras of the political demonstrations and the fiery slogans have ended, and an era has begun in which anything more than reason, study, and open debating is of no avail; otherwise, those who have not known how to win the war will never know how to win the peace.

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

IRAQI DEVELOPMENT AID--The minister of interior, Mr Sulayman Arar, announced upon his return from Baghdad yesterday that Iraq's Revolutionary Council has approved a \$30 million grant to Jordan. He added that he had signed the aid agreement on behalf of the Jordanian Government. Iraq's ambassador to Jordan, Mr Madlul Naji, described the Iraqi action as a genuine indication of Iraq's political leadership's intention to put its national income at the service of the Arab countries and to aid their development plans. The aid to Jordan, he said, is in addition to Iraq's contribution in support of Arab steadfastness in the effort to liberate every inch of Arab land. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 6 Oct 78 p 1] 9063

CSO: 4802

ALGERIA

ALGERIAN FINANCE MINISTER ADDRESSES NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON BUDGET

/Editorial Report LD/ Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 October 1978 carries on pages 2-3 the 5,300-word apparent text of Finance Minister Mohamed Seddick Benyahia's 30 October speech to the National Assembly on the 1979 draft budget. The minister began by stating:

"It is once again my weighty privilege to present to you the fundamental documents containing the draft finance law and draft budget." He went on to say:

"The continuity of our development work is clearly shown by the increase in state expenditure and its structure. The general budget is fixed at 36,771 billion dinars, a 13-percent increase over the financial year of 1978.

"This budget allocates 20,471 billion dinars for administration expenditure and 16.3 million dinars for definitive assistance to regional development. Compared with 1978 the amount allocated for administration costs has increased 12.7 percent, whereas the amount allocated to regional development has increased 14 percent.

"To cover all this expenditure there is provision for resources equivalent to 36,901 billion dinars which is a surplus of 130 million dinars. This surplus does not reflect a deliberate deflation policy, but rather our desire to have a positive balance in public finance and to avoid drawing on shaky sources of finance or sources which might generate dangerous inflation.

"Therefore, in 1979 budget resources will increase 13.2 percent over 1978. This increase will not be obtained by increased taxation but by better control over the tax levied, and there will even be tax relief and rebate which I will outline later."

The finance minister went on to outline reforms in the personal taxation system, plans to link tax allowances with income levels, incentives for the building industry, measures to promote cultural activity, emphasis on education and training which will "satisfy the needs of the national economy," and financial assistance to maintain price levels and to provide free health care, pensions and various other social benefits.

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

SOVIET AMBASSADOR RECEIVED--Algiers--Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, member of the Revolutionary Council and executive chief of the party machine, received USSR ambassador in Algiers Vasiliy Rykov on Sunday afternoon. Their talks dealt with bilateral relations and developments in the international situation, especially in the Middle East following the Camp David agreements, and their effects on the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights and the occupied Arab territories. /Text/ /Algeria EL MOUDJAHID in French
23 Oct 78 p 3 LD/

CSO: 4400

EGYPT

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ANNOUNCED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 11 Sep 78 p 3

[Article by 'Awatif al-Kailani and Sami Kamel: "The National Democratic Party Announces its Organizational Structure"]

[Text] The vice president of the republic and vice president of the National Democratic Party Husni Mubarak held an important meeting yesterday with the members of the General Secretariat of the party. The meeting lasted for 5 hours and discussed the measures taken in respect of elections of the party's committees in the constituencies to pave the way for the election of the higher level bodies of the party.

Later, Mansur Hasan, the official spokesman of the party and member of its General Secretariat, held a press conference and announced the organizational structure of the party. He said that it had been decided that the General Secretariat would select a number of public figures to become members of the Party's constituency committee provided that the membership, including the elected members, does not exceed 20. The aim, he said, was to enhance the capability of the party's committees in performing their respective functions. The selection of the non-elected members will be carried out after the completion of the party's organizational structure.

Associate Membership

Mr Hasan also said that it had been decided to consider all those who had already applied for membership as associate members until the president of the party forms the rules committee which will review the membership of all the members who were accepted at this stage, even those who reached the highest levels of the organizational structure.

He went on to say that the door to party membership would be open again after the completion of the current elections to allow every citizen the chance of joining the Party, if he desires to do so.

The official spokesman of the party also said that after completion of the elections to the constituency committees, the General Secretariat would determine the date for holding the party congresses in the governorates.

Mr Hasan noted that consideration was given to the question of the proportional representation of the workers and farmers at all levels of the party's organizational structure. He said that a number of the teaching staffs of the universities would be included in the membership of the governorate committees of the party to benefit from their academic qualifications in strengthening the processes of political action in the party.

The Organizational Structure

The organizational structure of the party goes from the base to the top as follows:

The Constituency Congress: It consists of all the members of the party in the constituency. It elects the constituency committee.

The Constituency Committee: It consists of 12 members, a youth representative and a women representative, members of the Peoples Assembly from the constituency and the president of the local council of the post or division who join the party. The membership of this committee is completed to 20 members by selection through a decision by the General Secretariat.

The constituency committee elects from among its members the staff of the constituency bureau. The bureau will consist of six members including: the secretary, two assistant secretaries, a youth representative, a women representative and a treasurer. If the president of the local council becomes a member of the constituency committee by election, he has the right to be a candidate for the membership of the bureau staff. If he is a non-elected member of the constituency committee, he had no right to be a candidate for membership of the bureau staff.

The Governorate Congress: It consists of all the members of the constituency committees in the governorate. The president of the local council becomes a member of this congress if he is a member of the party. The congress elects the staff of the governorate bureau which consists of the secretary, two assistant secretaries--one of whom at least should be a worker or a farmer--a treasurer, a women representative and a youth representative. This congress will also elect two members from every constituency to represent the governorate in the general congress of the party, provided that one of the two elected members, at least, is a worker or a farmer.

The Governorate Committee: It consists of members of the bureau staff, the secretaries of the party's committees in the constituencies, the reporters of the governorate congress; specific committees, one member or more representing the teaching staff, professors, associate professors,

and assistants of the university or college in the governorate. The bureau staff conducts the political activities of the party through the secretaries of the constituencies and the specialized activities through the reporters of the congress' specific committees.

The General Congress: It consists of the elected representatives of the constituencies numbering 350, members of the parliamentary body numbering about 300 and 150 members to be selected from among the public figures and other persons of qualifications who are members of the party.

The Standing Council: It represents the link between the general congress and the congresses and committees of the governorates. It holds its sessions periodically and at dates not far apart. The standing council follows up the implementation of the general congress resolutions while the congress is not in session. It also draws plans for the activities of the specific committees.

The Party's Supreme Council: It consists of the president of the party, the vice president and a number of party members elected by the general congress and a number of others selected by the president of the party from among the public figures. The supreme council selects the party's secretary general and assistant secretary generals.

The Specific Committees: It has been decided to form 25 specific technical committees specialized in the following five sectors:

1. **The Political Sector:** The Arab and Foreign Affairs Committee, the Defense and National Security Committee, the Propaganda, Culture and Information Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee.
2. **The Membership Affairs Sector:** The Rules Committee, the Membership Affairs Committee and the Complaints and Suggestions Committee.
3. **The Economic Development Sector:** The Economic and Financial Affairs Committee, the Irrigation and Agriculture Committee, the Food Security and Building and Construction Committee, the Industry Committee and the Tourism Committee.
4. **The Social Development and Services Sector:** The Housing Committee, the Transport and Communications Committee, the Health Affairs Committee, the Population and Family Planning Committee, the Social Affairs and Insurance Committee, the Scientific Research and Education Committee and the Supply and Trade Committee.
5. **The Public Affairs Sector:** The Youth Committee, the Womens Committee, the Professional Unions Committee, the Workers Committee, the Farmers Committee and the Tradesmen Committee.

EGYPT

POPULATION CONTROL PROGRAM SHOWS SIGNS OF SUCCESS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 10 Sep 78 p 5

[Article by Salah Jalal: "Indicators of Success...How Is It Achieved and Why? For the First Time Miracle was Realized and Birth Rates in 11 Governorates Dropped"]

[Text] The number of members of a family in the Egyptian rural areas averages 5.5. This means that a family is made up of six surviving persons while a neighboring family consists of five persons. This is the average desired by married couples. A family does not consider this average as abnormal. Before considering the question of calling for family planning in Egypt, we should know the reasons behind adherence of the Egyptian families to this average.

If we realize that the so-called "pride" in kith and kin is one of the reasons and that help in farming is another, that fear of losing children as a result of diseases is a third reason and that the love of having sons is fourth, any assistance to the Egyptian family to correct the irregularities in terms of better security, a higher standard of living, more earnings, promoting the use of suitable agricultural machinery, improving health services and allowing the girl the chance to be educated, work and earn a living in an honorable way should reduce the urge for having more children in an uncontrolled and unrestricted manner. As such, the so-called "pride" will be in the society as a whole, and peace and security will be guaranteed to the poor and simple people, as well as to others. Services will be distributed in a semi-just way between the city and the village and the pressure of migration from the rural areas to the cities in search of a better standard of living and higher incomes will be alleviated.

If we deal with the causes of the disease and if we focus our attention on protection from the problems before they occur and on closing the doors on danger before it spreads, then we will be using the proper approach to tackle with the demographic problem.

Statements and speeches, pamphlets and propaganda and making available the means of preventing or delaying pregnancy are of no real avail, unless we deal with the roots and origins of the problem.

As such, the United Nations Program for Demographic Studies in cooperation with the Egyptian Family Planning and Population Control Organization, chose Egypt for its pioneering project in the development of the rural areas, promoting the dignity of man, helping him to solve his problems and restoring his self confidence to be the solid foundations on which man can stand and think with conviction that the smaller the family, the more affluent and the more secure it will be. Consequently, it will be the sound and healthy call for building up a healthy society.

That is what happened in the four governorates where the United Nations project began and then extended to 11 other governorates. Soon, the project will cover 19 governorates.

From the start, the governors themselves showed interest in the project and presided over its committees and meetings which included the leaders of the villages, heads of the local units, representatives of the rural development programs, workers in the various public services including education, public health, agriculture, social welfare, family planning and population control, religious leaders and representatives of the youth, the village bank and cultural organizations. They also included non-official personalities interested in serving the public.

For the first time, village girls who have had some adequate education were selected to be rural guides assigned to establish contracts with wives and mothers, interact with the society, gather public opinion about the basic problems of the society and the ways and means to solve them by collective action, self efforts and available resources, together with technical and material assistance from the Family Planning and Population Control Organization and the United Nations Program for Demographic Studies.

But the basic and original effort should come from the people of the village themselves, from their conviction and their momentum.

During the first year of the implementation of the project and despite many and complicated problems and meager resources, miracles were realized, even if measured with any criteria. Positive indicators to the success of the project began to appear.

These indicators appeared in all the villages where development projects began whether by arranging student education booster classes or anti-illiteracy classes or expansion of a carpet-weaving workshop or establishment of a unit for producing mastic gum or a beehive for producing honey or buying a tractor for the collective use of the village or purchasing a bus with a loan from the bank to solve the problem of transportation. Tens of such examples in the villages where

development projects were introduced helped enlighten the villagers about the demographic problem and motivated them to try to alleviate its effects. There was a greater demand on family planning services. The number of those who sought such services increased by 50 percent. In some of these villages, enrollment in the family planning centers increased by 300 to 500 percent over before introducing the economic, agricultural, cultural and health development into the village.

In villages such as Hawd al-Tarfah, Safur, Tum al-Marj, al-Hijazi, al-Barshu, al-Fadadnah, Bulaq and al-Shukr in al-Sharqiyah Governorate for example, rural development was introduced first and then these villages themselves bypassed the projected target of cutting down the birth rate by one per-thousand, annually.

In other villages which had never known or used the family planning services before, the situation changed when development was introduced. There was a great rush on family planning services. The villages in question were Ashmawn al-Rumman, al-'Iyadiyah and al-Hafafiyah.

The demand on the family planning programs showed a dramatic development in those villages which became more self-conscious, more self-confident and began to enjoy life and to get rid of some of their economic and health ills.

**A Picture in Figures Showing the Progress
Achieved During the First Six Months of
Introducing the Development and Population Control
Into Seven Governorates**

| Village | Project | | The Target Number to Decrease the Birth Rate |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| | Number of Wives Practicing Pregnancy Control 3 Months Before the Project | Three Months After the Project | |
| al-Sharqiyah Governorate | | | |
| Firsays and al-Sutuhiyah | 280 | 322 | 334 |
| Umm Ramad and al-Tayibah | 248 | 336 | 315 |
| Bir'Ammar | 34 | 71 | 79 |
| Kafr Najm | 405 | 449 | 252 |

Project

| Village | Number of Wives Practicing Pregnancy Control 3 Months Before the Project | Three Months After the Project | The Target Number to Decrease the Birth Rate |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Hawd al-Tarfah | 35 | 106 | 64 |
| al-Minya Safur | 226 | 1018 | 353 |
| Dirb al-Suq and Kafr Abu Barri | 197 | 235 | 201 |
| Tama al-Marj | 100 | 350 | 225 |
| Sa'ud Island | 145 | 300 | 487 |
| al-Dhawahiriyyah | 63 | 77 | 281 |
| Samakin al-Gharb | 205 | 905 | 239 |
| Mansha'At Abu 'Amir and al-Hijadhiyah | 145 | 646 | 281 |
| Qarmut Sahbarah | 470 | 548 | 127 |
| Bahnqyah | 267 | 281 | 175 |
| al-Adliyah | 545 | 570 | 235 |
| Hurbit | 320 | 450 | 260 |
| al-Fadadnah | 50 | 376 | 65 |
| al-Qalyubiyah Governorate | | | |
| Abu al-Ghayt | 400 | 430 | 334 |
| Biltan | 160 | 262 | 171 |
| al-Saqqaniyah | 400 | 554 | 76 |
| al-Shaqr | 19 | 118 | 92 |
| Al-Daqahliyah Governorate | | | |
| Mit Damsis | 61 | 207 | 155 |
| Kafr Sarnajah | 188 | 258 | 141 |
| Salamun al-Qimash | 440 | 932 | 227 |
| Asyut Governorate | | | |
| al-'Aqal Bahari | 100 | 350 | 271 |
| Dirnakah | 104 | 124 | 438 |
| al-Shamiyah | 15 | 49 | 228 |
| Mungabad | 125 | 140 | 397 |
| Kafr al-Shaykh Governorate | | | |
| Shab'as 'Amir | 180 | 245 | 727 |
| Kafr al-Murazqah | 440 | 490 | 690 |

Project

| Village | Number of Wives Practicing Pregnancy Control 3 Months Before the Project | Three Months After the Project | The Target Number to Decrease the Birth Rate |
|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|

al-Buhayrah Governorate

| | | | |
|------------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Saft al-'Inab | 150 | 183 | 171 |
| Dimitwah | 85 | 118 | 98 |
| Sumukhrat | 124 | 269 | 206 |
| Shubra al-Tawnah | 100 | 230 | 99 |

al-Gharbiyah Governorate

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------------|----|-----|-----|
| [graph as published] | 80 | 245 | 117 |
| Shafa and Krawm | 70 | 200 | 162 |
| Kafr Nasmah Kum al-Najjar ⁴⁰ | | 90 | 30 |

Another Picture Showing the Monthly Change In Practicing the Family Planning Services Among the Women in Certain Villages of the Development and Population Control Project

1 al-Sharqiyah-Safur Village
January - March 1975

April - June 1978

257 women

482 women

2 al-Qalyubiyah :

Mar Apr May Jul Aug 1978

| | | | | | |
|----------------|----|----|----|-----|-----|
| Balqas Village | 18 | 15 | 17 | 55 | 55 |
| Mit Halfa | 55 | 45 | 50 | 114 | 135 |
| al-Shaqr | 15 | -- | 19 | 50 | 46 |

Another Picture Showing the Monthly Change In Practicing the Family Planning Services Among the Women in Certain Villages of the Development and Population Control Project

3 al-Buhayrah:

| | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | 1978 |
|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|
| Sumukhrat | 47 | 24 | 53 | 74 | 101 | 94 | |
| Saft al-'Jnab | 50 | 50 | 50 | 70 | 50 | 63 | |
| Mansha'at Dimisna | 20 | 20 | 20 | 34 | 20 | 29 | |
| al-Hassan | -- | 121 | 93 | 105 | 112 | -- | |
| al-Ibrahimiyah | 20 | 50 | 30 | 57 | 37 | 53 | |

Statistical Report Showing the Results of One Year's Work in the Development of Certain Villages in the Egyptian Countryside. The Birth Rate Dropped in Ten Governorates Between the Years 1976-1977

- 1 Qana from 37.75 per-thousand to 34.78 per-thousand
- 2 Damietta from 37.73 per-thousand to 36.82 per-thousand
- 3 Sawhaj from 38.45 per-thousand to 37.82 per-thousand
- 4 al-Sharqiyah from 39.22 per-thousand to 39.05 per-thousand
- 5 Asyut from 40.66 per-thousand to 38.01 per-thousand
- 6 Bani Suwayf from 41.83 per-thousand to 41.74 per-thousand
- 7 Ismailia from 41.89 per-thousand to 39.79 per-thousand
- 8 al-Jizah from 41.96 per-thousand to 38.51 per-thousand
- 9 al-Fayyum from 42.53 per-thousand to 41.90 per-thousand
- 10 Aswan from 42.85 per-thousand to 38.42 per-thousand

In respect of the decrease in the birth rate and at the same time increase in the demand on family planning, the governorates come in the following order:

al-Sharqiyah, Asyut, al-Jizah, Qana, Aswan, al-Daqahliyah, al-Qalyubiyah, Sawhaj, Bani Suwayf, al-Jizah, al-Fayyum and al-Gharbiyah

We still have to know the development processes were carried in the Egyptian villages by the efforts and under the leadership of the villagers themselves. We will publish tomorrow the third and last in the series of these articles.

6800
CSO: 4802

EGYPT

AGRICULTURAL CROPS EXPORT POLICY FORMULATED

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 9 Sep 78 p 9

[Article by 'Ali al-Maghribi: "Agricultural Crops Export Policy"]

[Text] A new policy for exporting agricultural crops has been formulated. It is based on the implementation of a plan that maintains a balance between local consumption and meeting the needs of the internal [sic] market in a way that keeps the prices for the consumer stable.

The new policy takes into consideration the successive increase in world production, especially in the consumer states with the European states at the top of the list.

The implementation of the initial stage of the plan calls for allocation of areas of land for growing vegetables and flowers for export purposes, away from the areas allocated for the local market.

These remarks came in a statement made by 'Izz al-Din al-Sayyad, president of the Nile Company for Export of Agricultural Crops.

Mr al-Sayyad said that the plan depends on the continued availability of agricultural products in world markets, as a substitute for the futures system. The plan also calls for price flexibility and development of the ways of selling the non-traditional crops. He went on to say "This is because our dependence on the traditional crops creates difficulties including the deterioration of quality and decrease in the available quantities for export or withholding exports, on certain occasions."

He announced that a quarter million tulip bulbs had been imported in addition to those stored in the refrigerators.

He also said that contracts had been signed for exporting 5,000 tons of vegetables under the new plan to Holland, England, Germany and France. Other contracts are being negotiated with the Arab market to meet its needs all year round from the crops of the new areas. Mr al-Sayyad said that exports would no longer wait for the surplus from the local consumption. The exports would follow the free market system while establishing minimum prices so Egypt can collect the greatest possible returns in hard currencies.

6800
CSO: 4802

LAW NEEDED TO ENABLE FARM COOPERATIVES TO FUNCTION

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 20 Oct 78 p 26

[Article by Yusuf al-Qa'id]

[Text] At the present time, in each of the 4,000 villages of Egypt, there is a farm cooperative and a village bank or the representatives of one. Both the cooperative and the bank have a headquarters, warehouses, workers, a guard, messengers, and officials, and an inspector visits each to examine its books and records. The peasant finds himself in a state of real perplexity over the respective roles of the cooperative and the bank and the fine line which separates the one from the other.

I selected the governorate of al-Gharbiyah as an area in which to try to depict the situation because it has the largest number of village banks in the country, and, in that governorate, I selected the administrative district of Tanta because Shubra al-Namlah, the first farm cooperative in Egypt's history, was opened there. I went to Shubra al-Namlah, where there are representatives of the village bank of Mahallat Marhum, to which Shubra al-Namlah belongs. The district of Tanta has 54 villages, with a farm cooperative in each, and 8 village banks, which have representations in the villages in which no banks have been opened.

The agents of the farm cooperatives, or what is left of them, say that the mere appearance of the village banks has left no role for the cooperatives to play. All of the financial resources moved to the village bank, leaving the cooperative without any, and all that has remained for it to do is participate in the work of crop rotation, agricultural guidance, and administration of whatever minor projects are still in progress, such as farm tractors and the like. Thus, the cooperative has not even been able to fulfill its financial obligations as in the past in the payment of building rent and wages.

The cooperative, being one of the organizations of the ministry of agriculture, is supposed to perform the work of administering the cooperative movement. However, that is not enough; the general structure of the cooperative movement must actually exist. Al-Hajj 'Atiyah al-Sayyid Rizq, member of the farm cooperative from Mahallat Marhum,

says that the cooperative law has been on the agenda of the People's Council for 2 years, but nonetheless has not yet been debated. He says that the enactment of it is desired so that it will give the cooperative movement a definite role and the bank will not exist at the cooperative's expense.

The Volume of Deposits in the Village Bank

Deposits in the village bank of Mahallat Ruh alone reached 14,000 pounds this month. That is fine, but is this the function of the bank only? The law provides that the bank must offer all of its services to everyone in the village, peasant or not, and even the peasant does not participate in the cooperative so that the bank may provide him with its services. There should be an obligation; it is necessary that the peasant belong to the cooperative. It is not merely a question of supply and demand, but the role that the state plays, and the role of the cooperative is very important. Although the faults and imperfections have been numerous in the past, the conclusion is not that the cooperative movement should be eliminated, but only that it should be purged of those elements which have harmed it. Furthermore, it is feared that the bank might fall into some of the former mistakes of the cooperatives in Mahallat Ruh. It rents two warehouses at 20 pounds per month and pays its workers 542 pounds per month in salaries. The question of whether the bank covers these expenses or not is not to be set aside. Nevertheless, let us henceforth keep the unreasonable and unjustifiable agreement in mind, because it is the beginning which leads to further problems.

The Missing Link

The supposition is that the bank is merely a financial institution to which the cooperative applies to finance the programs which it plans. Nevertheless, although a whole year has gone by since the village bank was set up, there is not one cooperative that has brought forth a production project which is financed by the bank on the national level. The link of cooperation between the two continues to be absent. If you go to the bank, they will tell you promptly, "We are ready to finance any project immediately, but the initiative must come from the cooperatives first." In the cooperative, they will tell you, "All the commissions that the cooperative used to get have been diverted to the village bank, and the cooperative hasn't received any revenues." The Mahallat Marhum cooperative, as an example, pays 190 pounds per month in salaries and wages, and, with the stoppage of the cash flow, [it can scarcely] even pay the salaries. It is difficult [for it] to carry out production projects, especially since the administrative board is elected and has no spare time. The members of the administrative board of the cooperative are themselves the ones with the projects. Each of them has poultry-raising projects, fattening projects, and farm tractor projects, and these themselves are the projects that the cooperative is supposed to take care of. Nevertheless, these men do not care to engage in such projects through the cooperative and at their own expense at the same time. I mentioned that to one of them, and he said to me, "When it is done on the account of the cooperative, there are many obstacles that hinder the work."

PRO-SHAH WRITER EXPECTS VIOLENCE TO END SOON

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 2 Sep 78 pp 14-15

[Article by Antoine Matta: "Pro-Shah Iranian Writer Talks to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI: "People Deceived by Clergymen But Problems Will End This Month; Crisis in Iran Is Crisis of Society, Not of Regime, and Shah Is the Revolutionary"]

[Text] The latest cabinet change in Iran constitutes an important transformation in the shah's approach to his country's problems, topped by the religious problems. This change also shows that the regime prefers to admit that it is weak than to continue to oppose the influence of the clergymen.

The new cabinet formed this week by Ja'far Sharif-Emami in the wake of the resignation of Amuzegar Jamshed's cabinet under the slogan of "national entente to rescue the homeland from danger" has demonstrated considerable understanding for priorities that constitute important, even though "symbolic" and "moral," concessions to the opposition. The prime minister has urged "national unity under the canopy of the Koran and the constitution." He has also issued a decision restoring the country to the Hegira calendar instead of the royal Persian calendar, which has been effective since 14 March 1976, and closing down casinos and gambling establishments.

The shah had in turn urged his government to adopt basic measures "to observe the principles of Islam, to wipe out corruption and to develop national education" within a framework of "ethics, cooperation, fraternity and solidarity."

Will the opposition, both leftist and rightist, accept the measures of the new government to bring the country out of the state of violence, or has the shah followed a path that many others before him followed when they started to make concessions in the face of violence and did not stop making concessions until they came to their end?

Following is a quick review of Iran's political map and an interview with a pro-shah personality this time:

Two axes sum up a half a century of Iran's life: The shah's "empire" and the clergymen's "empire." Between the two empires, there is an abyss that contains as much confrontation and defiance as it consists of a process of absorption, containment and molding of a society that has entered the age by force through the oil gate, whereas its roots are still in the medieval ages--a society that has sunk between the flow of an ambitious, daring and rejuvenated future and the ebb of a past that fears to open up because it is afraid of being uprooted.

What is happening in Iran is primarily a crisis of a society where the violence is neither change nor a revolution, where change is the captive of obstacles and where the revolution is revolutions with conflicting slogans.

Iran, which entered the international "chess" game once under the ground through the oil gate and once above the ground through its geo-strategic location is still in the middle of a dark tunnel. Iran will have to either stop the march and retreat to the zero point or continue the march to emerge to the light of democracy and modernization.

No to the shah, but yes to whom?

No to change, but return where?

These are two positions that reflect the opposition's inability, as an opposition to the regime, to rule. The nature of this popular wrath and the role of the clergymen inciting and stirring it do not justify either this violence that is shaking all parts of the country or the dictatorship of the shah or the accomplishments and mistakes of his regime.

So what is happening in Iran?

It is the uprising, outburst and fury of a people who have not yet reached the point of separating religion from clergymen.

Even though the rule of the Pahlavi family since Reza Shah assumed power on 25 April 1975 has been characterized by change, it has also been doomed to always clash with a social reality restricting its ambitions and its march.

Father to Son

Reza Shah, the father of Shah Mohammad, defined the structures of the modern state of Iran in accordance with the principle of separating the civilian, religious and military powers with the aim of transforming the state from feudalist structures to a state enjoying a strong central rule that relies on a military force needed for the country's domestic and foreign security requirements: Imams in the mosques, soldiers in the barracks and officials in the ministries.

This idea of change occurred to Reza Shah since reforms were started by Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish nationalist leader, to build a modern state with a European character, including the separation of religion from the state and curbing the inherited and obsolete customs.

The first of Reza Shah's reforms dealt with the field of education and then with the field of religion, as in the case when he prohibited all forms of beating, torture and blood letting on the occasion of the 'Ashura' anniversary [sacred day to the Shi'ites commemorating the death of Husayn, prophet Muhammad's grandson, in Karbala']. The clergymen rebelled at the time, made threats of all kinds of woes and instigated the people against such restriction of their powers.

Reza Shah fell under the impact of foreign pressures--including the Russian-British struggle for or agreement over Iran's oil--in which domestic factors were entwined. These domestic factors were confined to the wave of popular resentment instigated against Shah Reza by the clergymen. Shah Reza was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, on 16 April 1941. With Shah Mohammad Reza, Iran continued to march along the aforementioned reform line. Since 1949, oil revenues have given Iran a cultural developmental dimension, namely: Building the homeland within the framework of Iranian criteria that are neither capitalist nor socialist, and not even communist; completing the post-oil phase according to programmed and phased development bases and rules; completing the process of modernizing the state and laying down the democratic foundations for the state; separating the church from the state; establishing civil marriage; establishing equality between men and women and giving women the right to vote, to travel, to demand divorce, to enter public service and to engage in the free professions; giving every Iranian the right to acquire a piece of land; establishing labor participation in the profits of plants; amending the agricultural regulations, rules and laws and nationalizing the natural resources. All these accomplishments--which can be summed up as the broad lines of the "bloodless revolution" that the shah had formulated by the beginning of 1963 to lead Iran by the late 1980's to the present level of the advanced industrial European countries--give rise to the question: Why this "revolution" against the shah and to which faction do the people engaged in this revolution belong?

The first angry party has been the clergymen: No to women's liberation, no to the "atheistic Western aspects," no to industrialization and no to every change creating an upheaval against traditions and heritage and constituting a violation of the principles of the shari'a. The clergy have not forgiven the regime for the agrarian reform program that has given the peasants the opportunity to live on lands that they possess or that the awqaf possess.

The shah on his part realized that if he wanted to push his reforms forward to enable his country to take a big stride forward, he would have to do it in phases and not to be drastic in his change and modernization process. He also considered a return to the 1906 constitution a step backward and a squandering of 20 years of ceaseless efforts to bring the country out of the medieval ages.

Despite his inability to pull out the roots of stagnation and corruption in the administration and to bridge the gap between the various classes in order to achieve social justice, the shah has not backed down on his policy.

What is the democracy the need for which the shah is talking about?

Is it the "popular democracy" that the Communist Party (Todah) and another part of the leftist opposition, which includes the supporters of former [and deceased] Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddaq, is talking?

Or is it "religious democracy"?

Between 1951 and 1953, Iran suffered from a parliamentary system with a number of parties that burdened the country, paralyzed its economy and shook its political entity. During this period, Iran witnessed 30 cabinet changes, beginning with the cabinets of Foroghi and (Ghafam Soltanah) and ending with the cabinet of (Hosaynullah).

The shah realized that democracy and popular awareness are twins and that awareness requires in the first place greater reforms in the educational field, from the elimination of illiteracy to the construction of elementary schools and universities. The shah even went further and said: What is the use of giving people the right to vote when they cannot read or write? Can we in this day separate democracy from the information media? This is why the shah concentrated on fighting ignorance and eliminating illiteracy which prevailed among nearly 88 percent of the Iranian people. The shah recruited youths in the "education army" within a plan providing for the distribution of 2,500 youths of conscription age to teach in villages. This nearly 80 percent rate of illiteracy is expected to drop to about 50 percent.

The Iran "of the democratic structure" is not the Iran of the political map between August 1953, i.e. the time of the coup by Zahedi against Mohammad Mosaddaq and of the return of the shah to rule Iran, and August 1978 when Iran sank in the swamp of violence and destruction. What are the borders of this map and what are its most important locations?

In the middle, there are the shah, the state, the army and (Rastakhia) Party (the rejuvenation party), the only party in the country, in addition to the poor classes which recently won the right to land ownership and which want to work to live.

On the right, there is a "church" that is conservative to the point of narrow-mindedness, that clings to its rights, privileges and powers and that is hostile to the communists and also to whatever is Western in addition to the feudalists with vast land ownerships who cling to their lands, and the aristocracy of the big cities that prefers to maintain the gap separating it from the common people, such as the peasants and the small merchants who constitute the majority of the Iranian people.

On the left, there are the intellectuals, the educated members of the National Front and the communists.

What unites the clergy with the leftists is not creed nor a joint action program but the desire to overthrow the shah.

The clergy do not want the reforms, whereas their leftist allies want many and fundamental reforms.

Insofar as the clergy are concerned, women should not vote and should have no rights, and the country should remain conservative and far from all modernization, whereas the leftists demand speeding up the process of educating the people, of employing funds and of investing money in economic and social development.

Why have these sides of the opposition agreed with each other? If they want to overthrow the regime, is violence the path?

Meeting With Supporters

You ask yourself these questions and then you carry them to the Iranians themselves. AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI has already interviewed and debated the Iranian opposition and this is why it is interviewing and debating the supporters today.

Writer and journalist Faredon Sahebjam, the author of the book "Iran in the Year 2000," is the pro-shah Iranian with whom we have conducted the following interview.

[Question] This is a question that we are asking repeatedly: What is happening in Iran?

[Answer] History is repeating itself. The names have changed but the policy of the clergy has not. I see in Ayatollah Khomini and in Sharyat Madari the Imam Jomah Kashani and others who lived at the outset and in the first half of this century. Since the days of Reza Shah and since the nationalization crisis in Mosaddaq's time and until the present, the clergy have played the role of instigation and of kindling the fire. In 1963 when the shah laid down the foundations of the "bloodless coup," demonstrations were staged against the reforms in June and were led by Ayatollah Khomini and the big feudalists, and hundreds of people were killed. Today and in the wake of the new reform plans that the shah drew up at the outset of 1978, they want to play with fire again.

[Question] What do the clergy want?

[Answer] They want the people to remain unenlightened, with little knowledge, far from education, the captive of ignorance and lacking in awareness so that they may maintain their control, domination and influence over the common people who are driven by their faith to believe what the clergy say. The clergy's slogan is God: God says this, God wants this, God wants us to demonstrate against the shah and victory is ours and the Moslems', God willing, as if the shah is an infidel and an atheist. They have privileges and rights that they are afraid to lose. They are also members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.

[Question] Are the people so "enchanted" by what the clergy say?

[Answer] The people are simple, illiterate and faithful. The concept of God tickles their feelings and they become emotional and spontaneous and fall quickly the victim of their faith and the prey of words that they do not understand. They listen to the clergy enthusiastically and they are extremely influenced by the clergy. The clergy are an enormous power of instigation and, regrettably, this power is aimed against the shah on all occasions. The people are quickly electrified by the words of the clergy and become obedient to them. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the section of the people that has started to learn, to understand, to read and to travel has begun to realize that God is not what the clergy say and that this section has begun to liberate itself from the clergy's atmosphere [domination].

[Question] How do you explain this wave of popular violence and turmoil?

[Answer] The most dangerous month in Iran is the blazing month of August. It is the month of rebellions and uprisings. If we look back at the period of the 1950's from Mosaddaq's resignation on 16 July 1952 to Zahedi's coup and the overthrow of Mosaddaq on 15 August 1952, we find that the violent demonstrations and the acts of sabotage and destruction that accompanied them on 16, 17 and 18 August remind us of what is happening today. Do not forget the role of Imam Kashani and the (Fedayan Islam) Movement in all that has happened, especially since the events this year coincide with the venerable fasting.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because the hot weather charges and inflames the souls. Moreover, the ministries are closed and the civil servants, the students and the workers are on their annual leave. You even find army and police men half asleep in this month.

Crisis of Society

[Question] But Iran is in a crisis today?

[Answer] It is the crisis of a society and not of a regime. Our country's oil revenues have risen from 4 billion dollars to more than 22 billion dollars that are employed to build the foundations for a new society and for a homeland that must rise from its stumble. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi is a believer and so are Bourguiba, Boumediene, al-Bakr and King Khalid. They are all working to enhance the status of their countries. Why aren't the clery to enhance the status of their countries. Why aren't the clergy rebelling against them and charging that all the accomplishments they make in the fields of industrialization, reform and modernization are in violation of the shari'a and of the Koran's teachings?

[Question] And what about the left?

[Answer] What left? The shah is the prime "leftist" and "revolutionary" in Iran. We are also leftists. The former prime ministers are all leftists, beginning with Mohammad Mosaddeq and ending with Amir-Abas Hoveyda and Jamshed Amuzegar. They have all been leftists and they have criticized and opposed the shah. They are now in the palace and are close to the shah, along with numerous other men who believe in action and not in slogans, in the homeland and not in destruction. We reject the destructive left as we reject the fanatic and radical right. These people do not represent more than 10 percent of the entire Iranian people. We cannot permit the Communist Party to engage in public activities. Our borders with the Soviet Union are 2,500 kilometers long.

[Question] And what about the people?

[Answer] There is a general feeling among the army ranks and among the people that Iran is the shah. It is the "imperial" and "monarchic" feeling that is compatible with our country's history. It is a collective feeling and the people do not understand the word "republican."

[Question] And what about the reforms?

[Answer] The workers have been sharing nearly 49 percent of the profits since 1963. Isn't this a revolutionary and patriotic action? The woman has been liberated from her shackles and is now equal in rights to man. Is this a violation of the shari'a and of religion? I want to add here that Empress Farah is the Shah's successor in case he is exposed to an act of assassination or to sudden death. This is something "revolutionary" in a Moslem country. We have formed the "education army," the "development army" and the "health army" from among students performing their compulsory military service so as to develop the countryside and to educate the peasants. This is a social movement whose slogan is the pen and the rifle. All these reforms raise the slogan of the "bloodless coup" whose banner has been raised by the shah to serve our country and the renaissance of our people.

[Question] So you are in the transition period about which the shah is speaking a lot these days, namely the phase of "democratic building"?

[Answer] The word "democracy" in its Western concept does not exist in Iran. The West's liberalism is comprehensive and absolute whereas our democracy will have its limits: Giving the people public liberties while at the same time rejecting the radical left and the radical right. Iran can be ruled by a regime that moves from the center to the moderate left, i.e. from the Giscard-type to the Mitterand-type left, as is the case in France, keeping in mind that Iran has always been ruled by the center and the moderate left--i.e. the reform-oriented left, beginning with Mosaddaq and ending with Hoveyda and Amuzegar.

In a Moslem country like Iran, the people want the king to remain at the head of power, i.e. they want him to rule and not follow the rulers. This is why we favor the form of the Fifth Republic in France where the president of the republic has almost absolute powers. In our country, the prime minister is an "honorary" position. However, we are trying to move from the "presidential" system to a more liberal system so as to open the opportunity for the ministers and the legislative bodies to carry out their responsibilities in achieving a kind of separation of powers and to reduce the shah's powers. This will take place in stages.

Neutrality Impossible to Us

[Question] What about the armament operation in which the regime is engaged?

[Answer] Iran has been exposed in the distant past and the near past to invasions by the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the Moguls, the Turks, the British, the Germans and the Russians. It is still arousing the ambitions of major powers. The Soviet Union is seeking to control our northern shoreline on the Caspian Sea and our oil in order to get to southern outlets on the Gulf. This was the dream of Peter the Great 2 centuries ago. Moreover, we cannot be neutral: Our geographic location, our wealth and our history make neutrality prohibited to Iran. This is why the shah has chosen the West as an ally to help him safeguard the security of his country, its entity and its territorial integrity. I believe that the fall of the shah will make it easy for the Soviet Union to control Iran.

[Question] How do you see the future solution to the situation in Iran? Has the shah reached a dead end?

[Answer] No. I bet that with the beginning of September, with the onset of the venerable holidays, with the return of the cold weather and with the return of the workers and the students to their factories and their schools, the situation will return to normal and life will resume its normal course.

From Shah to His Son

[Question] How do you view the future of Iran and the future of the shah and of his regime?

[Answer] Iran will continue to live this miracle and the shah must remain 10 more years to achieve the accomplishments that he has formulated. He will then be 68 years old and the crown prince, who will then be 28 years old, will be able to complete the march and to bring about the "post-oil" phase and the phase after the year 2000. Our hope in Iran is not to return to the Middle Ages.

[Question] How will the current situation be made to move?

[Answer] The shah is not infallible. He has often made mistakes of evaluation and of judgment, such as signing an agreement at times or selecting a prime minister at others. The shah is concerned with everything. But even if there are mistakes, we must still steer clear of violence and destruction and must extend our hands to correct them. Let me give you an example: The increase in benzine prices in 1967 led to an uproar that ended with a strike by taxi-cab drivers and by fuel stations. But the shah quickly reconsidered this measure. Another example is that the Iranian people cannot withstand any increase in sugar prices because sugar is sacred in their daily life (tea). The issue of sugar cane, as happened in 1905, can be exploited by certain circles to create confusion. The entente will come with September. On 4 September, the shah will receive the Arab ambassadors in Teheran, a faction of the left and some clergymen. Iran will return to its normal life and the country will continue its development march.

"Tight Game"

This was the interview with Faridon Sahebjam.

It remains to be said that the international circles that have expressed reservations toward the situation realize that Iran's domestic conditions are of the dangerous type that is liable to explode and to cause a flaw in the existing balances at the regional and international levels. In Washington's strategic, economic and military calculations, Iran occupies a delicate position with clear-cut and well-known lines. It is difficult to say that these calculations are liable to change because of an upheaval or a demonstration. The limits of Moscow's direct movement are also not liable to change under the canopy of the present international detente.

However, Iran's present situation is of the kind of "available opportunities," i.e. it is subject to several possibilities that are not so much of the "fatal" type as they are of the type of "error in evaluation." Washington is not ready to make an error of the type. Moreover, Moscow doesn't want its leap to be fatal. This means that in the chess game of U.S.-Soviet relations, Iran is a tight game and it is difficult to know who will make the "check-your-mate" move without counter concessions and prearranged bargainings.

In the regional calculations, Iran is pivotal in the Arab lines and in the Israeli lines. It even meets with these lines, even though they are parallel. It will enter the Camp David gate on 5 September as part of Carter's concerns and as part of al-Sadat's card and of the pressures on Begin, as well as through the new Chinese movement whose broad lines are hostile to the Soviet Union.

Because the U.S. strategy in the area which is suffering heavily from the conflicts among the various parties in the region, is threatened with the danger of collapsing, the leap of Peter the Great becomes possible to achieve.

The middle East situation reacts with the conditions in Iran and vice versa. What is said about the possibility of partitioning Iran into mini-states or about turning it into a religious state of a certain character projects all the likely possibilities in the area, beginning with the comprehensive solution and ending with religious mini-states of a sectarian character.

The shah is benefiting mainly from the weakness of his opposition and its inability to rule and to establish stability. Though this opposition is capable of moving the man in the street, it is incapable of securing succession without falling into a vacuum and chaos. The Iranian citizen has his hand on his heart: A step forward and a glance backward.

This is unless what is sought particularly is falling into a vacuum and into chaos.

8494
CSO: 4802

CAPITALIST SYSTEM'S EXPORT OF INFLATION DEPLORED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Sep 78 p 3

/Article by Muhammad Hijazi: "Followup: Inflation and Development" /

/Text/ The United Nations General Assembly in its current 33rd session is discussing a report on worldwide inflation's effects on the development process. In the light of the study of which the report is a part and which was prepared by a group of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) experts, the General Assembly will determine what must be done, including the possibility of holding an international meeting on inflation.

Attending the UNCTAD meeting, which was held in Geneva, were high-level experts belonging to a number of industrial capitalist, socialist and developing countries.

These experts arrived at the conclusion that in order to defeat and overcome inflation, a broad group of goals must be taken into consideration, including the maintenance of full employment and dynamic economic growth for the overall world economy by supporting the development process.

The Geneva meeting reached unanimity on the notion that there are fundamental mutual interconnections between the essential policy being applied to fight inflation in the short term and the growth pattern of industrial capitalist economies in the long range, in particular the interdependency of inflationary pressure, unemployment, protectionism, economic growth and balance of payments disturbances.

In their study, the experts stressed that one must understand these interdependencies in the context of the existing structural problems of the advanced industrial capitalist countries' economies and the overall world economy.

It was observed that these economies' structural paralysis has reached the point where, on some occasions, long periods of sluggish growth have not been able to alleviate inflationary pressures.

In this regard there was agreement that measures being taken to increase competitive power will also help reduce the high costs of the vacillation and interconnection of growth and inflation and will also help developing countries improve their ability to compete in industrial capitalist countries' markets.

The important issue in the matter is that the study points out, in an obvious form, that the capitalist industrial countries' response to the just demands of the developing countries will constitute a decisive factor in overcoming world inflation.

The study stressed the importance of coordinating overall demand policies, in particular fiscal and monetary policies on the international level. However, this coordination must take place in an organized manner among all portions of the world economy, especially the developing countries. The current international situation, which is distinguished by a dis-equilibrium among the basic industrial capitalist economies (the United States, Canada, Western Europe and Japan), reinforces the importance of co-ordination among various contradictory world demand policies.

In addition, increasing pressures for more protective measures--in particular measures directed against developing countries--arise from the continued sluggish growth in the world economy over a long period. These protective measures, in turn, have, in the long range, led to the exacerbation of inflationary pressures.

In addition severe fluctuations in the prices of basic primary commodities exported by the developing countries have inflicted extreme damage on all parties to the world economy. In this regard, the links between the domestic economies and the world markets, which are joined together by mutual relations, on the international level, as regards growth, inflation and price movements, have been severed.

Therefore, the stability of the markets and prices of basic commodities through a common international fund and an integrated basic commodities program will constitute a basic factor in overcoming world inflation and will be of common interest not only to the developing countries but also to all parties in the international economy.

11887
CSO: 4802

LAND TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT PLANS REVIEWED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 15 Sep 78 p 6

/Article by 'Umran Rashid: "The Land Transport Organization--a Comprehensive Development Plan"/

/Text/ Attainment of the ambitious goals and central tasks which the national development plan for 1976-80 has defined demand that all the powers and efforts of productive and service organizations be intelligently employed in a manner consonant with these objectives and tasks in creating an evolved socialist Iraq. This is embodied in democratic practices and in the constructive criticism of exposing the mistakes and obstacles in the way of the growth and development of the process of change in all sectors.

Proceeding from this premise, the Symposium To Study the Factors Affecting the Decline in Productivity, which was held on 7 September 1976 and lasted for 3 days, is to be considered a prominent event which the political history of modern Iraq had not witnessed. It stressed the true meanings of democracy through the exercise of objective self-criticism and prompted a number of productive and service organizations to review their plans and management structures in a manner whereby they were able to take advanced steps to increase production and improve production quality.

The General Land Transport Organization is considered an important organization and a pillar in the construction of an advanced national economy aimed at bringing the desired socialist society into being.

It started with a modest beginning in 1970 as one of the socialist sector public companies belonging to the Ministry of Economy. Following the rise in the nation's imports from Arab and foreign countries, in the wake of the explosive plan, it developed in 1976 to become an organization comprising five agencies--the General Ordinary Cargo Transport Agency, the General Passenger Transport Agency in the City of Baghdad, the General Traveler Transport Agency, the General Specialized Transport Agency, and the General Overland Transport Services Agency.

A Comprehensive Work Plan

Following the Symposium To Study the Factors Affecting the Decline in Productivity, the organization, as Mr Dakhil 'Ali, chairman of the General Land Transport Organization, says, set forth a comprehensive work plan which included efforts to complete manpower planning and distribution, in accordance with "specialization and need," within its agencies, in order to meet essential staff requirements and to plan for technical and managerial development starting in the early part of January 1977. In addition, it set forth and specified quantitative and qualitative productive goals for each agency, specifying the factor of time, the month and year, as well as the criteria for expenditures on operating expenses and for monthly followup to evaluate performance and stipulate production incentives.

The work plan also included review of solutions and remedies to obstacles in the way of the organization's development and tasks, concentrating on expanding establishment of training centers devoted to preparation of administrative and operating staffs, constructing garages for parking and repairing cars, and establishing bases for cooperation and coordination among this and the other state organizations and bureaus in order to provide the best services at high capability, by means of committees, the convening of constant meetings, and coordination with bureaus concerned with repairing streets and squares.

As a consequence of this, the chairman of the General Land Transport Organization went on to say, good results were attained and these appear clearly on the graphs of the organization's agencies' production trends; in January 1977 the General Ordinary Cargo Transport Agency achieved a high productivity, as the following comparison shows:

| | Number of Operating Vehicles | Volume of Output, in Million Tons per Kilometer |
|--------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| January 1977 | 1,222 | 118, or 91 percent |
| January 1978 | 1,442 | 197.6, or 116 percent |

The organization's chairman attributes the reason for the productivity increase which has been attained to the fact that most vehicles transporting cargoes in 1976 were local ones, ranging in capacity from 2 to 35 tons, while the capacity of the agency's current vehicles comes to 16 to 35 tons. These indices show the importance of overland transportation in transport activities within the country, and the scope of the economics of operating it: the organization's trucks altogether account for 8 percent of the cargo vehicles and transport 15 percent of total shipments in the country.

Nonetheless, the results achieved in the context of cargo transport have not attained the level envisaged because of the poor quality of roads, which has the effect of directly influencing vehicle productivity from the standpoint of operating costs and accidents in which many lives and much money are sacrificed. He presents as an example of this the fact that

the process of traveling the main Baghdad-Basrah road is difficult for cargo trucks because the road is narrow, the trucks skid during rains and there are no rest stops along the road--by which he means spots where trucks may park to be supplied with fuel, inspected, repaired and maintained. In addition, the road is deficient in telephone communications and traffic signs.

Primitive Equipment

The chairman of the organization goes on to state that primitive loading and unloading equipment also constitutes a major obstacle because of the slowness of the current truck loading and unloading operations whose effect is reflected in the productivity of the trucks and the reduction in the number of cycles they perform every month or year. This problem arises from the fact that it is the trucker who performs the unloading and loading operation, which is generally done in primitive ways without the use of fork lifts or cranes and without placing some agents' cargoes in covered containers which can be easily moved to the trucks to save time.

There is another problem, which may be summarized by the fact that most loading and unloading sites lack scales; although these exist at certain sites, they are primitive and are not in keeping with the volume of the work at hand--to say nothing of the fact that they do not exist in harbor docks, which compels trucks to go to a weighing zone far outside the harbor to weigh the truck prior to loading, and, after loading, to go back to the same place before moving on to the storehouse sites, returning to the person taking delivery, and being unloaded after the cargo is weighed again. If scales were present at port entrances and exits and at entrances to main roads and storehouses, about 25 percent of the overall time spent in the vehicle's cycle, which totals about 4 days, would be saved.

To this one should add the storehouses' failure to accommodate cargoes and the shortage in the number of drivers and technical workers and standby equipment; this obstructs the overhaul and maintenance programs and keeps them from being performed in the desired way, leading to the loss of much time in the repair of truck breakdowns; as a consequence this is reflected in their productivity.

Table No 1

Productive Goals of the Agencies Belonging to the General Land Transport Organization

One: General Ordinary Cargo Transport Agency

| Objective, Million Tons per Kilometer 1978 | Number of Vehicles | Realized First Half 1978, Million Ton-Kilometers | Objective, Million Ton-Kilo- meters, 1979 | Number of Vehicles |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1,955 | 1,435 | 1,007 | 2,400 | 1,668 |

Two: General Passenger Transport Agency

| Objective, Million Passengers, 1978 | Number of Vehicles | Realized First Half, 1978, Mil- lion Passengers | Objective, Mil- lion Passengers, 1979 | Number of Ve- hicles |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 265.8 | 70 | 130 | 280.4 | 780 |

Three: General Traveler Transport Agency

| Objective, 1978 | Number of Vehicles | Realized First Half 1978, Thousands of Passengers | Objective, Mil- lion Passengers, 1979 | Number of Ve- hicles |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Unspecified, because agency received its buses and started op- erating them on the first route 1 May 1978 | 75 | 54,648 | 1,244 | 100 |

Four: General Specialized Transport Agency

Beginning 1 January 1979 the agency will publish its activities, along with the number of vehicles it is expected to operate (252); its objective is 212.9 million ton-kilometers.

Table No 2

**Table Showing the Number of Passengers Transported in Passenger Transport
Buses in the First 6 Months of 1978**

| Month | Number of Buses | Number of Passengers Transported Objective | Number of Passengers Transported Realized |
|----------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| January | 623 | 22,700,978 | 21,183,326 |
| February | 623 | 22,157,574 | 20,201,933 |
| March | 831 | 22,157,574 | 23,251,281 |
| April | 578 | 22,157,574 | 22,571,179 |
| May | 577 | 22,157,574 | 21,652,310 |
| June | 572 | 22,157,574 | 22,005,281 |
| Total | 3,804 | 223,205,952 / | 130,865,310 |

Table No 3

Statement of Output in the General Cargo Transport Agency, 1978, in the First and Second Quarters

| Month | Vehicles Oper- ating | | Volume of Output in Mil- lion Ton-Kilometers | | | Rate of Income, in Thousands of Dinars | | |
|----------|-------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------------------|----------|------|-------------------------------------------|----------|-------|
| | Number | Tonnage | Objective | Realized | % | Object. | Realized | % |
| January | 1,442 | 45,232 | 170 | 197.6 | 116 | 1,096 | 1,216.8 | 111 |
| February | 1,409 | 44,654 | 172 | 166.5 | 97 | 1,151 | 1,164.7 | 101 |
| March | 1,409 | 44,654 | 172 | 171.4 | 99 | 1,151 | 1,269 | 110 |
| April | 1,427 | 45,408 | 171 | 146 | 85.3 | 1,143.5 | 1,047.4 | 91.5 |
| May | 1,435 | 45,643 | 171 | 168.6 | 98.5 | 1,143.5 | 1,148 | 100 |
| June | 1,435 | 45,643 | 171 | 156.9 | 92 | 1,143.5 | 1,040.4 | 91 |
| Total | 8,557 | 271,234 | 1,027 | 1,007 | 98 | 6,828.5 | 6,886.3 | 100.8 |

The objective of the General Specialized Transport Agency is to perform the activity of transporting cargoes with peculiar specifications over land by means of trucks and trailers which are specialized in this purpose. Since it was recently established, the agency has not yet performed activities of this type. It recently received 50 vehicles, including some to transport processed cement from the al-Kufah cement plant; 70 trucks will soon be delivered for grain transport.

The transport capability of the General Passenger Transport Agency in the City of Baghdad has improved as a result of reliance on a scheduling system, organization of bus activity by lines, review of the routes of a number of lines, route changes in a manner ensuring that the best services will be offered citizens, and raises in the living standards of drivers, collectors and technicians. In addition the labors of a large number of collectors are being properly employed by relying on a system of operating buses without collectors, by training collectors in driving activities and other technical activities, and by conspicuously raising production rates in bus repair and maintenance activities. A number of old buses have been rebuilt and moved out to work on routes at a high rate of competence.

This becomes clear when one compares the number of passengers transported in the months of January 1977 and 1978:

| Year | Number of Passengers | Number of Buses Operating per Day |
|------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1977 | 14,653,800 | 454 |
| 1978 | 21,183,326 | 623 |

Obstacles and Solutions

Nonetheless, as the head of the organization states, the ambition of achieving better output, going beyond the objective toward which the organization is striving, is still meeting with obstacles which obstruct the course of proper operations. Most important of these is the lack of a staff of drivers and technicians; in order to eliminate this, a start has been made on giving basic training to a number of people signing up for employment as drivers through this agency's Vocational Training Center; however, this will not satisfy the actual need for drivers because the number of applicants is small in spite of the benefits the organization offers.

In addition, traffic bottlenecks constitute a great obstacle to the smooth flow of bus movement, owing to the large numbers of vehicles which the General Automobile Organization has provided without the prior organization and expansion of the road system, and provision of automobile parking and garaging areas and dispatch and arrival areas. This situation has been reflected in the low productivity of buses.

New Agencies

The General Travelers' Transport Agency actually started its activities after socialist sector buses entered the field of transporting passengers between governorates, when the Baghdad-Nineveh route was inaugurated on 1 May 1978 with a capacity of 20 buses, 16 of which are operating and four of which are in reserve. The Baghdad-Irbil route was inaugurated on 1 June 1978 with a capacity of six buses, equally divided between both directions, followed by the Baghdad-Salah-al-Din route, with a capacity of five buses, the Baghdad-Basrah route, with a capacity of 20 buses, and Baghdad-Wasit, with a capacity of 14 buses.

Operating results for the month of June show that the number of passengers transported came to 37,090, and the proportion of travelers on the Baghdad-Irbil route totalled 27 percent of the grand total of passengers, while the revenues for that month came to 37,821 dinars.

11887
CSO: 4802

STATUS OF NATION'S TEXTILE INDUSTRY DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Sep 78 p 3

/Article by Malik Mansur: "Textile Industry: High Growth Rates and Constant Need To Surmount Obstacles"/

/Text/ Within the country's current national development strategy, which relies on the principles of central scientific planning and the optimum use of available material and human resources and materials, the industrial sector has experienced noticeable improvement in the process of attaining the goal of building the material and technological base of the national economy, on the premise that this is a base, and a decisive condition, of the revolution's ability to continue making radical, revolutionary changes in the economic, social and political structure and to deepening and implanting socialist transformations.

Heavy and light transformation industries have assumed a large part of the national development plans' attention because of the many positive advantages with which they are characterized--particularly the use of local raw materials in processing productive and consumer goods, in the place of imported industrial goods.

Development of the Textile Industry

The textile industry in Iraq has witnessed great development, characterized by high growth rates, in order to keep up with society's growing consumer needs for various kinds of cloth, clothing and upholsteries on the one hand and in order to continue building the technological base for this industry, and acquiring the technical expertise necessary to insure its future development in a manner responding to and conforming with the policy drawn up for applying this technology on a national basis, on the other.

While the capital invested in the textile industry up to 1968 came to 9,036,068 dinars and rose in 1977 to 75,199,000 dinars (an overall growth rate of 732 percent for the period), this growth in invested capital was accompanied by a corresponding growth, during the same period, in the value of output and the number of workers. The rate of growth of the value of

output totalled 888 percent, that is, it rose from 6,186,867 to 61,151,000 dinars; the number of workers rose by 194 percent, that is from 8,364 to 24,657 male and female workers in the same period.

Total Output before and after the Revolution

In the context of actual output, productive capacities in 1968 were limited from the standpoint of quality and quantity, since domestic output constituted only a small percentage of total actual local market requirements. The remaining local market demand was met through imports, as the table below shows:

| Product | Unit of Measurement | Capacity, 1968 | Capacity, 1976 | Targeted Capacity, 1980 |
|------------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------------|
| Cotton Cloth | Million meters | 38.6 | 120 | 165 |
| Woolen and mixed cloth | Thousand meters | 360 | 4,700 | 8,000 |
| Synthetic cloth | Thousand meters | nil | 900 | 6,200 |
| Silk cloth | Million meters | nil | 66 | 66 |
| Rugs | Thousand meters | 120 | 1,000 | 3,000 |
| Blankets | Thousand pieces | 150 | 1,200 | 3,200 |
| Knit products* | Thousand pieces | nil | 6.2 | 16.3 |
| Readymade clothes* | Thousand pieces | 260 | 3,800 | 8,000 |
| Knitwear | Thousand pieces | 4,800 | 13,300 | nil |
| Stockings | Thousand pairs | 6,000 | 7,000 | nil |

* Socialist sector only

Exceptional Effort To Remedy Obstacles

Even though the textile industry in Iraq was established decades ago, it remained limited in its capacity to develop, owing to the industrialization policies and directives of the previous reactionary and dictatorial regimes, which were founded on chaos and a lack of the most minor forms of planning. The Political Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party has shown the most important problems which such policies have raised; these have been reflected in existing industries, particularly as regards the lack of raw materials and the paucity of technical staffs and skilled manpower--problems with which the revolution coped from the time it was established, requiring exceptional efforts to surmount their negative effects.

Numerous bottlenecks were broken, difficulties were surmounted, new resources were made available in order to begin the process of developing and expanding many industries--including the textile industry--and numerous specialized plants were set up to produce different types of cotton and wool fabrics, synthetic fabrics and rugs and manufacture readymade clothes. Some of them have commenced production and others are still in the

construction and installation phase, within the time ceiling specified by the national development plan.

Up to 1977, which witnessed great expansion in productive capacities, the country continued to rely on imports to meet local market requirements for different kinds of cloth. The total import program for 1977 came to 148,775,000 meters, broken down among the following main kinds:

Cotton cloth, 105.4 million meters.

Cloth made of mixed fibers, 7.05 million meters.

Cloth made up of synthetic fibers, 36,325,000 meters.

Raw Material Problems

As regards the raw materials used in the textile industry, the present situation, in spite of the development this sector has experienced from the quantity and quality standpoints, continues to show a rise in the percent of raw materials imported. General Textile Industry Organization statistics show that the ratio of imports to total raw materials used in 1977 reached 68 percent.

To remedy this negative phenomenon, the national development plan for 1976-80 has set out the following general goals and indices:

Reduced reliance on cotton and wool through expansion in the use of mixed fibers.

Non-expansion in production of textiles relying on cellulose fibers since these are not available from local sources.

Establishment of modern projects for the production of ready-made clothes and knitwear.

The completion of petrochemical industry projects in the country will provide an opportunity for the local production of mixed fibers and it will thereby be possible to use local raw materials in available, developed cotton, wool and other textile capacities, as well as those for mixed fibers. It is therefore possible to consider that the situation which exists today constitutes only a temporary phenomenon, whose negative effects are limited and are to be considered restricted to the time period the supplementary projects will require.

Workforce Problems

The rapid development the textile industry has witnessed has required a doubling of the workforce and an unnatural increase in the need for technical staffs of engineers and for mid-level staffs. In addition, it has

been necessary to raise workers' capability in a manner conforming to the pattern of developments in technology, prompting the General Textile Industry Organization to adopt internal procedures to make use of time and try to raise operating capacities in new factories and installations or those which have been earmarked for expansions as well as other major operations. Among the most prominent internal procedures are the following:

First, the tendency to expand the use of female personnel. The number of female workers in the textile sector (socialist only) totalled 4,021, as compared with a total of 16,039; that is, the proportion of women to total workers comes to about 20 percent, a basically low proportion when we realize the basic trends which the development plan has stressed, calling for continued efforts to increase women's participation in the development process and provision of opportunities for their entry into spheres of productive labor.

Heightening the importance of the tendency to increase job opportunities for female personnel is the constant labor shortage; in 1977 this totalled 4,281 workers, accounting for 17 percent of the plan in the context of the organization's installations and factories.

Second, establishment of the textile and supplementary vocational training center in al-Kut to prepare mid-level technical staffs and raise workers' capability by creating courses to strengthen abilities and knowledge of the most modern technical production methods and the latest technological textile industry developments. The center also accredits new workers and supplies them with the basics in certain crafts in order to put them on the proper road to develop their abilities and potentialities on the job.

In the field of preparing mid-level staffs, the training center enrolls students for a period of 3 years who have graduated from intermediate studies.

Despite their effectiveness and importance, these procedures still lie within the realm of rapid remedies to reduce the severity of bottlenecks. The main procedures still represent the comprehensive solution which must be counted on in surmounting bottlenecks and obstacles. For instance, the Vocational Training Center will not be able to guarantee the enrollment of students in numbers commensurate with the Center's capacity to assimilate them or even in numbers responding to part of its requirements, as the following table, which shows a deficit in the numbers of students enrolled in the first class, beginning with the academic year 1975-76 stresses:

| Number of Students Entering First Class | Academic Year |
|-----------------------------------------|---------------|
| 92 | 1973-74 |
| 150 | 1974-75 |
| 83 | 1975-76 |
| 8 | 1976-77 |

The central procedures included in the development plan call for a rise in the number of students admitted to all vocational training branches from 7,745 male and female students in 1975-76 to 50,000 in 1980. This number accounts for 35 percent of the total students expected to enroll in preparatory schooling. In order to assimilate these numbers of students, the plan has approved construction of 225 vocational schools, 121 of which are industrial schools.

In the context of higher education, emphasis is being made on admission to scientific departments in order to ensure that increasing numbers of specialists and technicians graduate to cover national development plan requirements.

Development Trends in the Textile Sector

The textile industry in Iraq spread out in the form of small productive units. In the 1940's, a limited number of medium-sized cotton and wool textile plants were established in Baghdad and several governorates and the state played no part in this sector. In July 1964 the major textile plants were nationalized and came directly under state management. Owing to the nature of the reactionary dictatorial regime which took charge of the nationalization process, corruption and red tape spread through the management of these plants and chaos reigned on the production planning and programming levels.

After the revolution, it was necessary to work to solve basic production problems within in the context of socialist guidance, comprehensive planning, in order to place this sector in the service of the political, economic and social goals of the revolution.

Proceeding from this premise, the revolution established a number of large specialized plants and expanded those already existing. The socialist textile and clothing sector began to constitute the fundamental base for this industry; meanwhile, growth opportunities were granted to the private sector within the prescribed limits.

During the years of the national development plan, 1976-80, the growth rates of the socialist textile industry sector will rise greatly. A number of new projects have been carried out and others are being carried out which will have the effect of multiplying the size of the socialist sector and thus of multiplying its productive capacity in order to reach the plan's targeted goal in this field.

The year 1977 was the beginning of this evolution: the number of male and female workers rose from 19,873 in 1976 to 22,078 in 1977, and total production likewise rose from 37,849 dinars in 1976 to 61,151,000 dinars in 1977.

Some Sources

General Textile Industry Organization statistics.

Annual Statistical Compendium, Central Statistics Agency.

Political Report of the Eighth Regional Conference.

The National Development Plan, 1976-80.

11887

CSO: 4802

MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS DESCRIBES RURAL PHONE SYSTEM

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 17 Sep 78 p 4

/Article: Minister of Communications to AL-THAWRAH's correspondent: Start-up of Rural Telephone System Project Operation/

/Text/ Mr Sa'dun Ghaydan, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and minister of communications, has announced the start of operation of the telephone system project allocated to rural areas to provide them with telephone communications and eliminate discrepancies between the countryside and the cities in order to attain the creation of an advanced socialist countryside.

In a conversation with AL-THAWRAH's correspondent, the member of the Revolutionary Command Council stated that proceeding from this premise, telephone lines in the rural areas are now being linked up by coaxial cables connected to the microwave and ground station projects.

He pointed out that, with the conclusion of the national development plan, citizens in all areas of the countryside, even in some remote villages, will be able to get in contact with all towns and the outer world simply by dialling a telephone.

The minister stated that a start has actually been made on rural and urban exchange projects with a 250,000-line capacity distributed among 30 urban exchanges and 70 exchanges in district centers. A start has also been made on the 100-exchange system projects, with a capacity of 250,000 lines, in various parts of the country.

In addition the installation and operation of exchanges and telephone instruments apportioned among 12 peasant complexes and farms has been completed. They have been apportioned among the Narwan, al-Hamamat, Qaryat al-Makasib farms in Baghdad, al-Risalah farm in Dhi Qar, Shahrzuz farm in al-Sulaymaniyah, al-Tala'i farm in Babylon, al-Shamiyah farm in al-Qadisiyah, 30 July farm in Diyala and the al-Suwayrah and al-Shuhaymiyah farms in Wasit.

The Revolutionary Command Council member pointed out that the ministry's activity is not confined to bringing telephone services to rural inhabitants alone; it will also provide such other things as consolidation of television broadcasting for all villages and rural areas in the country.

The minister added that in our country's celebration of the 10th anniversary of the glorious 17 July revolution, the first part of the southern coaxial cable project, originally designed to extend from Baghdad to Safwan, with which main and branch stations will intersect, was inaugurated.

All the southern areas will be covered with modern telephone communications, whose overall costs come to 11 million dinars and are 1,000 kilometers long including the branches splitting off from it.

The Revolutionary Command Council member stressed that telephone density in various areas of the country is starting to rise in accordance with the stipulated plan and that it is expected that they will reach 2.6 phones per 100 inhabitants by the end of the current year, and three telephones per person in 1980.

11837

CSO: 4802

JORDAN

NEW HOUSING BRINGS SOME WORKERS BACK FROM GULF

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 23 Sep 78 p 4

[Article: "First Worker Town in Country Completed"]

[Text] Muhammad 'Abd al-'Abadi, a reporter for AL-DUSTUR, has reported that a number of skilled workers have cancelled their contracts with a foreign company operating in the Arab Gulf area and have decided to return to Amman. They decided to do so despite the high salaries they were receiving compared with wages in Amman. The news surprised me, so I went to find out more. One of the workers had this to say: "Don't be puzzled about this developments. It will be repeated often. You will see thousands returning if they can find suitable housing with reasonable rents that don't swallow most of their incomes."

Sensing a good story, I expressed the opinion that a major cause of skilled labor emigration has been the shortage of cheap and adequate housing. I asked him whether he believed new housing would slow down this migration, particularly at a time when the country needs those skilled workers. He agreed with my view and asked how the country can satisfy its demand for skilled workers in the midst of expanding development while average rent exceeds half the income of a typical Jordanian family. "Often," he added, "rent exceeds 2/3 or 3/4 of a family's total income." Faced with the other expenses of feeding and clothing his family, a worker has no choice but to leave. If housing is made available workers will not leave their country, and those who have left will return."

I asked how he was able to locate suitable housing. He told me about the workers' town erected by the Housing Authority. The company for which he works, he explained, had promised him a suitable housing unit at a very reasonable rent in this new workers town. The town is located close to a number of large industries and plants and has all the services and conveniences necessary for everyday life.

In order to learn more about the town--the first of its kind in Jordan--I went to the al-Hashimiyyah area, near al-Zarqa', where it is located. I spent several hours inspecting the housing units, all of which have been completed. It is indeed a magnificent town, well-designed and equipped with all services. It is strategically located near several large industries.

When I finished my tour I went to see the engineer, Hamdallah al-Nabulsi, the director general of the Housing Authority. He is credited with doing his best to improve the housing situation within the constraints of the country's circumstances. He was determined to solve a number of critical problems, which were largely attributable to the housing crisis.

Our interview centered on the al-Hashimiyyah worker town, not merely because it has improved the housing situation, but because it represents a real beginning in halting the emigration of skilled workers. The interview is reproduced below:

[Question] What role does the Housing Authority play in solving the housing crisis in Jordan? What has the authority accomplished so far, and what are its future plans?

[Answer] Despite the large increase in housing, the country has not been able to satisfy the rising demand. The Housing Authority is exerting extensive efforts to do its share to solve the problem. Since its creation in 1965, the Housing Authority has given 509 loans for individual housing units and has erected approximately 800 new units before embarking on a 3-year plan during which 1,558 other units were constructed at a cost of 3.5 million dinars. An additional 3,259 units have been constructed in the past 2 years as part of the authority's new 5-year plans for 1976-1980, to add 7,500 housing units. Thus, the authority has constructed 6,126 units to house approximately 40,000 people. The authority is presently implementing a number of housing developments in al-Tufaylah--26 units, al-Salt--36 units, and Irbid--36 units. The authority is planning 1,000 units for al-'Aqabah, 500 for al-Rasifah, 250 for Irbid, 200 for Marka, 100 for Amman, 250 for al-Zarqa' and 100 for Madaba. In addition, there are numerous plans for housing bedouins in the framework of the bedouin settlement program and a 6,500 unit project at Abu Nusayr. This brings the total of completed and planned units, within and outside the 5-year plan, to 10,000, serving the needs of 70,000 people. It is hoped that this will reduce the housing crisis or perhaps eliminate it altogether.

[Question] Could you tell us about the worker town at al-Hashimiyyah, its cost, etc.?

[Answer] The town is located 10 kilometers northwest of al-Zarqa' and covers 500 donums of land. It has 1,012 units--700 for low-income families, each with 60 square meters of living space, and 312 units for intermediate-income families, each with 86.5 square meters of living space. The total area occupied by the units is 70,000 square meters and the total cost of the project was 3.3 million Jordanian dinars.

[Question] What is the importance of the project and what role does it play in solving the housing crisis?

[Answer] The project's most salient feature is its location in the midst of the industrial zone, near the iron and steel plant, the textile plant, the metal pipes plant, the al-Husayn thermal power plant and the refinery. Workers in these plants benefit from the project, and approximately 1,000 of them live in the town with their families, numbering approximately 6,000. The availability of the housing units near the industrial zone has lessened the acute housing shortage in al-Zarqa' and Amman. The workers town is expected to lessen rural immigration to the cities and perhaps reverse the trend altogether. The proximity of the workers town to the industrial zone will also significantly ease the transportation problem between Amman and al-Zarqa'.

Engineer al-Nabulsi further noted that work is underway on two large schools one for boys and one for girls. Each will have an area of 3,300 square meters, cost 230,000 dinars and accommodate 500 students.

Also a campaign will be undertaken to encourage skilled workers to remain and settle in the country. One incentive will be the availability of cheap and adequate housing. An added feature of the workers' town is that it will provide all services, including schools, stores, a post office, a health clinic, parks, athletic and social centers, a police station and a municipal building. We have managed to make most of these services available and are working on the others. Water, electricity and the streets are all in good order.

Following my interview with Mr al-Nabulsi, I met with the engineer who supervised the construction of the town, Mr Sami al-Rashid. He informed me that an untraditional method of construction was followed during the building, one that, according to him, was perhaps superior to traditional methods. He particularly noted that the innovative method was faster, adaptable to more attractive designs and resulted in stronger construction. Aluminum cement frames were used to facilitate the erection of foundations and walls, and pipes, electric wires and iron enforcing rods were placed in position before the cement was poured. When the aluminum framing was removed, it produced a brick-like pattern on the exterior, requiring no further treatment or the application of plaster. The exterior walls were then coated with a plastic-based paint which is a good insulator and moisture resistant. A layer of asphalt was then applied to the roof for further insulation.

This construction method is the most modern in the building industry and has been used in the United States, Mexico, Iraq, Iran and Jordan. It is fast and time saving. Cement can be poured for the walls of two adjacent units in just 3 hours and a complete unit can be readied for occupancy in 5 days. This method is also economical and saves from 25 to 30 percent of the cost of traditional construction methods. It also facilitates the laying of electrical lines and sewers, and the application of plaster, as well as eliminates the need for brick laying and the erection of traditional iron-enforced corner pillars.

JORDAN

SOUTHERN AREAS OF KINGDOM TO RECEIVE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21 Sep 78 p 2

[Article: "The First Stage of the Electrical System for the Southern Part of Jordan to Cost 12 Million Dinars"]

[Text] The Jordanian Electric Authority has begun to prepare technical specifications and bidding documents for the first stage of the national electrical network project to provide the southern areas of the kingdom with electricity. Work is expected to begin in the next 2 months.

Electric authority sources disclosed that the first stage involves the completion of a 132-kilovolt transmission line around Amman by joining the Wadi al-Sayr transformer station with one located south of the city by means of a 20-kilometer line. This stage of the project also includes laying a double cable 132-kilovolt line from the station south of Amman to the town of al-Karak, 85 kilometers away. It also includes expansion of the station south of Amman and the addition of two 132-33 kilovolt transformers at the al-Karak station. In addition, a double cable 132-kilovolt line will be used to join the al-Karak station to the Potash company site in Ghor al-Safi, 50 kilometers away. This project includes expanding the al-Karak station and equipping the Ghor al-Safi station with two 132-33 kilovolt transformers, as well as laying a double 132-kilovolt line from the al-Karak station to the al-Hasa station, 50 kilometers away. The latter will also be equipped with two 132-33 kilovolt transformers.

Another double cable 132-kilovolt line will commence at al-Hasa station and terminate at the site of the new cement plant in al-Rashadiyyah, 50 kilometers away. The al-Rashadiyyah station will also be equipped with two 132-33 kilovolt transformers.

The estimated cost for this phase of the national project is 12 million Jordanian dinars to be financed by loans from the World Bank and Arab development funds.

JORDAN

PROJECT TO BRING RESERVOIR WATER TO AMMAN BEGUN

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 18 Sep 78 p 5

[Article: "King Talal Reservoir Water To Reach Amman by End of 1980"]

[Text] Work will begin at the end of this year on Jordan's largest project, which involves piping water from the King Talal reservoir to Amman. The project, slated for completion in August 1980, will end the water crisis in the capital city. The cost of the project is approximately 15 million Jordanian dinars. So far an area of 200 donums has been purchased where the necessary facilities will be constructed. The government has negotiated a 70 million riyal loan with the Saudi Development Fund, another 39 million dollar loan with the International Development agency and a 14 million dollar loan with the World Bank to finance several water piping and sewer construction projects in the country, including the King Talal reservoir project.

A report issued by the water and sewers authority provides the following figures as Amman's minimal water needs:

| Year | Amount in millions of cubic meters |
|------|------------------------------------|
| 1977 | 20 |
| 1980 | 28 |
| 1985 | 33 |
| 1990 | 44 |

Estimates of subsurface water:

| Year | Amount in millions of cubic meters |
|------|------------------------------------|
| 1977 | 15 |
| 1980 | 17 |
| 1985 | 18 |
| 1990 | 20 |

From these charts water shortages for the years indicated will be 5, 11, 15 and 24 million cubic meters respectively. The report also notes that bids have been opened for an in-depth study of water resources in the Amman area in order to achieve more accurate figures and to determine the best solution for providing the capital with water from outside sources.

Since all surveys to date indicate that the local water resources are adequate for only a few more years, the new study will concentrate on finding outside sources to satisfy the capital's future needs. One of these sources is the King Talal reservoir on the Zerqa River, 37 miles north of Amman. Preliminary studies indicate that piping water from the reservoir is feasible. The reservoir, when ready, will have a capacity of 48 million cubic meters of both river and flood waters. The preliminary studies project the piping of 10 million cubic meters of the reservoir's water to Amman annually in order to alleviate its water shortage. It is estimated that the project will require 2 years to complete and cost an estimated 12-to 15 million dinars, including the cost of design studies, the erection of pumping and purification stations, piping, administration, etc.

Based on the recommendation of a technical consulting firm's preliminary study done in 1976, the French Consulting firm Sugria was chosen from among a number of international companies to conduct implementation studies, prepare engineering designs and bidding contract documents. Negotiations were also carried out during the study phase of the project. On 21 May 1977, the draft contract for phase one of the project--which includes the construction of the main pumping and purification stations as well as the principal storage tanks--was presented. The draft contract for phase two, dealing with the design of water outlets and piping, will be ready in the next few days, following a review of both drafts by experts. The experts' changes and remarks will then be forwarded to the consulting firm for possible incorporation in the final contract. The present plan calls for beginning actual work on phase two about mid-December 1978. This part of the project includes:

1--Piping.

After a detailed analysis of soil samples along the pipe route and the maximum and minimum volume of water to be pumped, the consulting firm settled on the following pipe specifications:

Length: approximately 28 kilometers

Diameter: 800 millimeters

Type: steel

Method of joining sections: welding

Method of laying: most of the pipe will be buried underground except for the sections laid in rocky areas.

2--Water Intake

The selection and design of the water intake is a crucial part of the project and must take into consideration the height and thickness of fill at the bottom of the dam, expected changes in the volume of water pumped, the geological and topographical characteristics of the site and changes in the volume of water in the reservoir. The level of water in the reservoir is known to vary from a maximum of 175 meters above sea level to a minimum of 116.75 meters below sea level. The design is based on a level variation of 48.50 meters in the first stage and a variation of 58.50 meters in the subsequent stage.

Reservoir studies indicate that approximately 6 million cubic meters of water is unusable; the studies also show that every change of 1 meter in the water level corresponds to a volume of approximately 400,000 cubic meters. The study also takes into consideration the fact that a portion of the reservoir's water will be used for irrigation.

Based on analysis of these data, the number of possible intake designs were reduced from five to two. These two options, considered most feasible, were subjected to further study. They are:

1. A dry well
2. A floating intake station

Comparative analyses based on technical, economic, operation, maintenance and cost considerations lead to the selection of the floating station design over the other. The cost of a dry well intake was estimated 2 million dinars vs 1.4 million dinars for the floating station design, which was ultimately adopted.

9063
CSO: 4802

JORDAN

ARAB MINING COMPANY SUPPORTS INDUSTRIAL, MINING PROJECTS

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 17 Sep 78 p 2

[Article: "The Arab Mining Company Buys Potash Company Stocks and Approves Support of Other Industrial Projects"]

[Text] The board of directors of the Arab Mining Company yesterday concluded its meetings with an announcement by the company's director general, Mr Thabit al-Tahir, that after 3 days of meetings the board has agreed to buy 25 percent of the stock of the Potash Company, whose capital, according to the latest figures, is 63 million dinars. According to the announcement, the board will also buy 10 percent of the stock of the Chemical Fertilizer Company, whose capital is 40 million dinars. The total cost of the two deals will be 19.75 million Jordanian dinars.

The board is said to have reviewed the financial positions of several other enterprises in which the company has decided to participate. These are located in Morocco, Mauritania and Somalia. The board also reviewed the results of discussions between the company and officials of several other Arab countries.

The board of the Arab Mining Company has also agreed to buy 25 percent of the shares of the Construction and Industrial Materials Company of the Yemen Arab Republic. The Industrial Bank and the Home Mortgage Bank of Yemen are also said to have agreed to buy 7 percent each of the Yemeni company's shares.

In a related development, it was disclosed that Mr Thabit al-Tahir left Amman for Mauritania yesterday to sign a contract to establish the Mauritanian company, which will control the iron mining operation in that country. Following his visit to Mauritania, Mr al-Tahir will go to Washington to participate in a World Bank meeting of financial backers of the Mauritanian company. The Arab Mining Company is said to have decided recently to support the Mauritanian enterprise.

It was also disclosed that the Tunisian Government has agreed to become a partner in the Arab Mining Company, bringing the number of Arab countries participating in it to 14. The announcement was contained in a telegram from the Tunisian Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy to the Arab Mining Company.

9063

CSO: 4802

JORDAN

ARAB POTASH COMPANY OPENS BIDDING FOR PROJECT

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 5 Oct 78 p 2

[Article: "Seven Companies Enter Bids for Potash Project"]

[Text] Bids for construction of evaporation basins, reservoirs and pumping facilities in the second and final phase of the potash project were opened the day before yesterday at the Arab Potash Company's headquarters. Seven international companies took part in the bidding.

Mr 'Ali al-Khasawneh, board chairman and director general of the company, discussed the bids and described the construction of the evaporation basins and reservoir as the backbone of the project. He referred to it as the major and most important part of the project.

In a press interview following the opening of bids, Mr al-Khasawneh estimated the final cost of the project will be 37 million Jordanian dinars. The cost includes the construction of main evaporation basins with a combined area of 80,000 donums and a number of dams totaling 55 kilometers in length. The cost also includes the construction of a pumping station with a capacity of 12 cubic meters per second. Water will be pumped to the evaporation basins in a 10-kilometer canal.

After water is pumped into the main evaporation basins, ordinary salt will be extracted at the rate of 8 million tons annually. From there the fluid is pumped into a second set of basins where potash will be separated from salts containing bromine and magnesium as well as other salts. It is expected that the extraction of these salts will give rise to other industries.

The director general of the company also said that the bids will be studied in the next 2 months until a company is selected to undertake the project, and that work will begin immediately thereafter. He estimated that the project will take 3 years until completion. Production of potash will follow and reach a level of 1.2 million tons annually by 1985.

The opening of bids was attended by representatives of the companies taking part in the bidding and a number of representatives from the American Union Company and other consulting firms, as well as by the board of directors and officials of the Arab Potash Company.

JORDAN

BRIEFS

AQABA SHIPPING TRAFFIC--There was an increase in the number of ships arriving at Aqaba port during the past months over the corresponding period last year. Port officials reported that 871 ships arrived at the port with a total of 317,324 tons of phosphates and other Jordanian goods as opposed to 623 ships carrying 992,722 tons which arrived during the same period last year. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 2 Oct 78 p 5] 9063

ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION--Consumption of electric energy in Jordan in 1977 increased by 18.29 percent over the corresponding figure in 1976. Sources at the Electric Power Authority said 595 million kilowatt-hours of electricity were generated in 1977 compared with 503 million kilowatt-hours in 1976. The sources added that the Governorates of Amman and al-Balqa' accounted for 85.22 percent of all power generated in 1977. The Irbid Governorate consumed 6.72 percent, the Karak Governorate 4.2 percent, while the Ma'an Governorate accounted for 3.86 percent. Per capita consumption in 1977 was given as 286 kilowatt-hours vs 250 kilowatt-hours in 1976. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 3 Oct 78 p 4] 9063

SEPTEMBER PHOSPHATE EXPORTS--The volume of exported phosphates in September of this year reached 239,435 tons. This is the highest volume ever exported in 1 month since the opening of the Aqaba port. During the past 9 months, 1,556,759 tons of phosphates were exported compared with 1,088,882 tons for the same period last year, an increase of 467,877 tons. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 5 Oct 78 p 2] 9063

FIRST QUARTER ALIA REVENUES--Alia's revenues during the first quarter of this year are higher than the figure for the same period of last year. Alia sources reported that revenues in the first quarter were 8.25 million dinars against 4 million dinars in the first quarter last year. Passenger revenue also doubled during this quarter period, reaching 5,941,000 dinars vs 304 million dinars last year. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 5 Oct 78 p 3] 9063

OIL REFINERY PRODUCTION--The Jordanian Oil Refining Company produced 1,145,455 tons of petroleum products in 1977 and the company's sales reached 1,121,682 tons. The sales included 12,557 tons of liquefied gas, 53,171 tons of fuel and 1,197 tons of diesel fuel used for the company's boilers and residential purposes. The sales also included the export of surplus fuel that exceeded local market demand. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 6 Oct 78 p 2] 9063

JULY MONEY SUPPLY--The money supply during July exceeded by 51,475,000 million dinars the corresponding level in July of last year. The Central Bank reported that the money supply in July was 357,749,000 million dinars compared with 306,004,000 dinars in July of last year. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 26 Sep 78 p 2] 9063

COMMERCIAL BANK CREDITS--Commercial bank credits for all sectors in the kingdom during July increased by 90,979,000 dinars over the corresponding figure for July of last year and were 3,446,000 dinars higher than the preceding month's figure. Credits last June were 292,835,000 dinars vs 201,846,000 dinars for June of last year. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 27 Sep 78 p 5] 9063

CSO: 4802

LIBYA

ADVANCED ARSENAL PASSES IN REVIEW

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 11-17 Sep 78 p 12

[Article: "Al-Qadhdhafi Reviews Advanced Soviet Weapons"]

[Text] A week ago last Friday observers turned their attention to Libya as it continued the celebrations of the ninth anniversary of the September revolution, particularly in the wake of reports that advanced Soviet weapons, obtained by Libya, would be unveiled during the ceremonies. In fact more than one Libyan official on more than one occasion had already confirmed that Libya had received weapons that thus far have not been made available to any of the Eastern bloc countries. Indeed all doubts evaporated when the LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY announced that Soviet Mig 25's had appeared during the military review. More specifically, it was revealed that Libya had obtained three versions of the plane. These are:

1. Mig 25A, a fighter plane equipped with missiles;
2. Mig 25B, a reconnaissance plane, equipped with a camera instead of radar. The plane is reputed to be more difficult to outwit [electronically] than one equipped with radar and subject to electronic interference.
3. Mig 25 Fox Bat S, which is a training plane equipped with an extra seat.

Noteworthy of mention is the fact that the "A" version has been in use in the Soviet Union since 1971. Use of the "B" version began in 1972. It is believed that the Soviet Union has produced only 400 planes of this type. And in view of the strategic and political importance of this information Western observers were understandably surprised. Some, in fact, expressed doubts about the accuracy of the reports. However, AL-DUSTUR learned from informed sources that a squadron of four Mig 25's, piloted by Soviet flyers, had been stationed in Egypt. The sources added that Egypt had made a bid to purchase the planes, but the bid was turned down. Thus Libya appears to be the only country in the area, and throughout the world, to gain possession of this advanced aircraft, a fact that has important military

significance for the region. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi described the Mig 25 as an "eagle" in comparison with the F-5, which he referred to as a "bird." On another occasion he said: "The Mig 25 is to the F-5 as a lion is to a rabbit." He added that the F-5 has become outmoded. As is well-known, there was a genuine, or perhaps feigned, battle when the American Congress approved the sale of F-5's and F-15's to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, respectively. And perhaps the remarks of the Libyan leader were intended to expose the tenuousness of America's friendship to her Arab followers.

The appearance of the Mig 25 was not the only surprise of the military exhibition; there were also missiles with ranges from 300 to 2,000 kilometers. Information on Libya's missiles is fragmentary, but the radio announcer, who gave a running commentary on the military review, said the missiles would be placed in the service of the Arab people in its struggle against its enemies and in furthering the Arab national interest. He added that "from that day on the weapons would be used in the interest of all liberation movements throughout the world."

Observers, curious about the range of the Libyan missiles, wondered whether the missiles could threaten Israel even if a peace agreement of any form were reached with Anwar al-Sadat. The LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY disclosed further that the number of tanks in Libya's possession exceeds 2,000.

There is little doubt that the appearance of Soviet weapons in Libya has many implications. Among the most important of these implications are the following:

1. Confidence and understanding between the leaderships of the Libyan revolution and the socialist bloc have reached a high level, leading to increased cooperation and coordination.
2. The sale of this type of Soviet weapons to Libya must necessarily imply a willingness on the part of the Soviets to protect the [Libyan] revolution politically and strategically against its surrounding enemies.
3. The military review comes as a practical response to developments in Chad, which, in one form or another, is hostile to Libya. Some observers believe that Chad will become a future confrontation front and that it will distract Libya's attention from its current concerns.
4. At a time when the internal situation in Tunisia is cloudy on the eve of Bourguiba's return, Colonel Qadhdhafi repeats in his address that he is still determined to live up to his obligations to realize Arab unity, and in particular with respect to the idea of unifying Tunisia, Algeria and Libya.
5. Of significance also is the fact that the military review took place only hours before the Camp David summit conference began, and that Colonel Qadhdhafi had rejected beforehand all possible outcomes of the conference.

6. The final implication is that the Soviets will not stand idle in the face of attempts to surround them strategically in both Africa and the Middle East.

So much for the military and diplomatic aspects of the celebrations. The internal aspect of the celebrations was underscored by Colonel Qadhafi's call to abolish the dictatorship of the private sector and his appeal to the workers throughout Libya to wrest their rightful share of production.

This year's celebrations came after the publication of the second part of the "green book," entitled "The Third View of the World." The book argues for a solution of the [workers'] economic problem on the basis of the principle that workers are partners in production and not mere hired hands of the business community. It advocates the abolition of rent regulations and the bestowal of home ownership on tenants. Furthermore, it calls for revamping mosque-related regulations and a purification campaign to rid mosques [religion] of unorthodoxy and unorthodox teachers.

Agricultural reform, which began 8 years ago, has gone a long way to date. It has progressed from a conceptual stage to a concrete agricultural revolution in which the workers live harmoniously in agricultural communities.

In connection with the anniversary celebrations mention must be made of the long-established program to build a diversified industrial base, one that is calculated to transform Libya in 25 years, that is before the oil resources begin declining, into an industrial nation. It is noted that the First Three-Year Development Plan, 1972-1975, was financed with 2,156,000,000 Libyan dinars. At the end of September 1972 Libya had 1,181 industrial establishments manned by 22,358 workers.

Perhaps the most important feature of the 'al-Fatih' revolution is that it charted its present course by drawing on its past experiences. It also preceded its social transformation by an educational one. This is why Libyan leaders insist that Libya is the "first peace-oriented nation on earth."

9063

CSO: 4802

LIBYA

OIL POLICY AIMED AT DIVERSIFICATION


Damascus SAWT FILASTIN in Arabic Sep 78 pp 56-58

[Article: "Oil Policy in Libya"]

[Text] Crude oil and natural gas are the backbone of the Libyan economy. Income from these two sources makes up 57.8 percent of the gross national product and is the principal source of financing economic development and foreign trade.

Table 1

Oil Production in Millions of Barrels
[figures as published]



What is more important is that the monopoly of oil profits by foreign interests has precipitated and continues to precipitate a revolutionary battle in the country. Speaking of this battle, Colonel Qadhafi had this to say: "After the [Libyan] revolution, Libya became the leader of the oil battle. It has led and continues to lead the oil-producing nations in demanding their rights and the control of their resources."

Before the September revolution foreign companies were bleeding Libya of its oil wealth, which in 1969 was the equivalent of 150 million tons annually. The foreign oil companies had a great deal of sway within the government, so much so that they were in fact a government within the government. It was thus imperative that the revolution should end that state of affairs and rescue the country. The revolution thus sought to liberate Libyan oil and to control its price. And in the same spirit it resolved to reduce production to a level compatible with our economic and social development and to preclude the possibility of depleting our oil resources prematurely, before other economic resources have reached the desired level of viability.

In an effort to wrest control of Libyan oil from foreign interests, the Libyan people took the following measures:


1. Foreign companies were disinvested of their political and monopolistic clout.
2. Oil income was put to the best possible use in financing Libya's economic and social development programs. This move was coupled with a push to change Libya's role from that of crude oil producer to an exporter of manufactured oil products. The revolution reduced the volume of pumped crude oil to a reasonable economic level, and resorted to a policy of processing oil products.
3. Libya took a leading role in setting oil prices for the benefit of oil producing nations.
4. Local marketing of oil was put under the control of the National Oil Company and foreign marketing of oil and natural gas was placed under the control of the al-Bariqah Company. To facilitate marketing operations, modern storage facilities and a fleet of oil carriers were acquired.
5. A policy to "Libyacise" training and employment practices was embarked upon.
6. A strategic policy aimed at creating an advanced and diversified oil and gas industry was begun. The policy, based on refining and the establishment of a petrochemical industry, led to the erection of the methanol and ethylene plants. One goal of the petrochemical industry was to move from the intermediate product stage into the advanced [oil] derivatives production stage, one that is complementary to the former and leading ultimately to large-scale manufacture of nitrogen-based fertilizers in sufficient quantities to supply Libya's agricultural needs as well as

exports. A second goal was to insure an adequate supply of methanol for use as fuel and as a base for more sophisticated products. Similarly, the construction of the ethylene plant was motivated by the substance's versatility in the manufacture of artificial fibers and plastics and the intention to push into an advanced industrial place.

The direction of Libya's oil policy will guarantee a balanced economic growth. It also insures that its oil wealth will be used to serve its national interest in the most effective manner.

Table 2

Estimates of total industrial production during the transition plan, 1976-1980, based on 1975 figures and on fixed 1974 prices. Estimates are in millions of dinars



9063
CSO: 4802

SUDAN

SADIQ AL-MAHDI DISCUSSES RECONCILIATION

Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 5 Oct 78 p 3

[Text] "National reconciliation is an interchange--a meeting-point of two shades of opinion, leading to a new conciliatory situation," said Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi. "Whoever does not understand it as such, is either demanding the impossible or trying to obstruct it."

The former leader of the opposition National Front was speaking in an interview published in the present issue of SUDANOW.

Mr Mahdi dwelt at length on the Ansar camps abroad and the contacts being made for repatriation of the Sudanese nationals in Libya and Ethiopia.

The SSU Political Bureau Member also elaborated to the monthly magazine on the position of elements that have not yet accepted national reconciliation.

Mr Mahdi emphasized the need for maintaining and consolidating the SSU, as the multi-party system "proved to be a failure."

Formation of political groupings is intolerable and will be fought every time, Mr Mahdi said.

CSO: 4820

SUDAN

SUDAN JOINS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SECURITY ORGANIZATION

Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 11 Oct 78 p 2

/Text/ The General Assembly of the Arab Organization for Social Defence Against Crime, in the 17th Session held in Baghdad 2-4 Oct., has selected Col. Police, 'Abdallah Taha al-Malik, Head of the Interpol Office at the Police Headquarters as a member in the Organization's Executive Office for a two-year term.

Beside the Sudan, the Executive Committee comprises Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)

The Executive Committee is entrusted to execute the Organization's objectives which include the approval of convening conferences, symposiums, training courses, participation in regional, Arab and international conferences, proposing means to organize cooperation between the Organization and the Arab League General Secretariat and other regional and international organizations.

Moreover, the Committee is entrusted to extend consultations to the Arab League Council in the fields of the Organization's activities and to review the budget and other financial and administrative issues.

CSO: 4820

SUDAN

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY EXTENDS LOAN

Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 10 Oct 78 pp 10-11

[Text] Brussels, Oct 10, (SUNA)--Sudan concluded here last night a loan agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) to finance the modernization of Babanusah-Rahad rail line.

The 9.18 million dollars loan is payable in 40 years with eleven years grace period.

The Minister of National Planning Nasr al-Din Mustafa and the Commissioner of Development at the EEC signed the agreement on behalf of their sides respectively.

Addressing the ceremony the EEC Commissioner stated that the agreement is part of a major project to be financed by the EEC aiming at modernizing the transportation networks in the Sudan. He expressed hope that the agreement will strengthen the existing cooperation between the EEC and the Sudan.

Expressing thanks to the EEC, Mr Mustafa enumerated in his speech the developmental projects included in the six-year plan, emphasizing those connected with communication and transportation.

The EEC extended loan to modernize Babanusah-Rahad rail line forms 10% of the 108,720,000 dollars loan allocated by the EEC for modernizing the communication networks in the Sudan.

Attending the ceremony were the Ministers of Agriculture, Industry and Energy and Mining and Sudan's ambassador to the EEC and Belgium.

CSO: 4820

SUDAN

PROVINCE DEVELOPS TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE

Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 8 Oct 78 pp 2-3

[Text] The last decade had witnessed an increase in traditional agriculture in North Kordofan, yet the agricultural services could not cope with the remarkable leap in the cultivated area.

Efforts to provide improved seeds and insecticides and promote the proposed agricultural guidance section are expected to effectively modernize and promote traditional agriculture in the region.

Contacts are underway to introduce machinery in Jabal al-Dayr and Khawr Abu Habil areas.

The province possesses tremendous agricultural and animal potential that would help establish leading industries, create more employment and curb migration.

The Development Committee of the province has drawn up realistic proposals for agricultural industrialization in the light of the available potential. The proposals include:

- 1) An expansion of oil industry and its bi-products.
- 2) Establishing glucose and starch factories.
- 3) Establishing flour mills.
- 4) The manufacturing of slaughtering remains.
- 5) Establishing leather products factories.

Local firms would receive copies from these proposals. They will then be subject to economic feasibility studies.

CSO: 4820

SUDAN

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN SOUTH DETAILED

Khartoum THE SUDAN STANDARD in English 27 Sep 78 pp 6-7

[Article by B. A. Buttice]

[Text] The Project Development Unit (PDU) has launched an ambitious Crop Development Plan in the Self-governing Southern Sudan. The PDU is a part of the Regional Ministry of Agriculture. Its headquarters is in Juba but its main centre of operations is in Yei River District of Eastern Equatoria Province.

The PDU began its extensive plan in 1974. This plan was scheduled for four years after which the PDU was expected to surrender its projects to the Regional Ministry of Agriculture but owing to late start the period was extended to 4 1/2 years.

The PDU according to the Project Director Mr. Macnab was estimated at 12.6 million US dollars of which 10.7 million was provided by the International Agency for Development (IDA) of the World Bank and 1.9 million by the Sudan Government.

In short, the PDU is in fact trying to bring about self-sufficiency to the Southern Region in food and cash crops such as sorghum, maize, groundnuts, soya beans, rice, yams, pigeon pea, other miscellaneous food trial crops, coffee and cotton.

The PDU is presently involved in crop development, nutrition, extension and training, feeder road building, mechanical workshops, small-holder cotton development, small holder coffee development livestock vaccination programme, livestock disease survey, provision of diagnostic laboratories, stockman training, small-holder diary development livestock marketing, livestock development, economic project analysis of both crops and livestock, financial control and Project Unit Headquarters supervision.

The PDU has eight (8) sections namely Agronomy and Plant Breeding, Seed Multiplication, Nutrition, Extension, Coffee, Cotton, Road and Workshop.

Agronomy and Plant Breeding:

The section deals with basic research to determine the best plant cultural practices for obtaining maximum yield which involves experiments in the field to discover the optimum spacing, time of planting, fertilizer and nutrient response and levels of weeding for obtaining the highest economic yields. This research, although concentrated at Yei, is also being conducted at sub-stations throughout the different ecological zones of the whole Southern Region. In this way the plant cultural practices best suited to a particular district can be clearly identified.

On the breeding side, the main effort is at present being concentrated on the testing, in number of ecological zones of exotic i.e. important plant varieties for their suitability for eventual distribution to the farmers as planting seeds throughout the Southern Sudan.

Another important part of any breeding programme is the collection and evaluation of the local material as possible sources of high yield and resistance to insect pest and disease.

A collection is also being made of the local insect pests and the incidence of disease noted.

It is hoped in the near future to obtain further specialist staff to work on the major aspects of crop protection.

Seed Multiplication

This section aims at the production of improved seeds in the Southern Region. It involves field production and inspection laboratory testing of purity and availability, then cleaning, dressing and distribution to small holder farmers.

Yei station, being the main centre for seed production activities caters for the production of basic seeds plus limited quantities of certified seeds of main food crops. The sub-centres at Maridi, Rumbek, and Torit do the same on a smaller scale.

Selected farmers, some government organisations and cooperatives societies contribute a lot in certified seed production through contract farming.

Expansion of areas under seed will continue year after year in Yei station sub-centres and through contracts to produce enough seeds to meet the increasing demand.

In 1978 the area for production of seeds from plants such as maize, sorghum, soya beans and groundnuts is 466 feddans.

Nutrition:

This section aims to identify areas in the region with food shortages, surplus and unbalances and suggests ways in which the situation could be ameliorated.

In Yei River District a year study is being carried out with selected families to identify seasonal food consumptions patterns shortages, surplus and preferences. In other areas shorter appraisals are being carried out when possible.

Extension:

This section is providing a service with relatively small plot areas that will assist small subsistence farmers in these areas.

Such services include the sale of in-puts to farmers i.e. improved seeds of maize, sorghum and groundnuts as well as hand tool, promotional work in the form of extending education so that farmers understand how best to use the new in-puts and improve their farming methods--thereby increasing production from their farms. This work is carried out by arranging for farmers meetings and by method and result demonstrations.

The section is also carrying out some general survey work which will show existing farm situations and constraints to production and with this information the extension programme can be continually updated with continual in-service training of staff.

Coffee:

The main objects of the coffee section are to provide coffee seedlings to small farmers in Eastern and Western Equatoria Provinces. In addition the Project Development Unit staff promote an extension service assisting farmers in techniques of planning, cultivation, pest and disease control, harvesting and processing. During the current planting seasons some 250,000 coffee seedlings will be supplied to eight (8) nurseries in Yei River District. Similar schemes, but on a reduced scale, are being run in Yambio, Maridi and Torit districts.

The PDU staff have assisted in setting up 170 farmers nurseries which will provide some 200,000 seedlings in the Yei River District alone.

At present the supervision of nurseries and the coffee extension services are being provided by a total of about 16 staff in both provinces. Further recruitment is envisaged. The Kingi plantation consists of approximately seven (7) feddans of coffee. Of this about 1.5 feddans is planted with excelsa coffee and the balance with Robusta.

The farm was brought back to cultivation about two (2) years ago and it is intended that it will serve as a demonstration plot for new techniques and provide seed materials.

Cotton:

With the transfer of the cotton officer to Yei, the cotton section was automatically moved to Yei.

The objective of this section is to provide an insect control service and extension advice. During the first year of operation about 2,000 acres of cotton were sprayed for insect control.

Road:

The PDU Road Construction Unit was set up to improve feeder roads into crop growing areas of the Region. The first road to be rebuilt will be Yei-Iwatoka-Lugulu. This area already has a lot of coffee and has potential for more crops, but access is difficult during the rainy season.

The Road Unit has been provided with two hundred and fifty Sudanese pounds worth of equipment and vehicles by the British Government and will eventually have a labour force of 150 people.

Workshop:

The Project Development Unit Workshop at Yei is to give support to all project development unit vehicles plus static plant.

The large new workshop will enable workshop repairs and vehicles servicing to be carried out more efficiently under good working conditions.

The workshop's present staff consists of four mechanics, three trainee mechanics, blacksmith, welder, technical storeman and fuel storeman.

The project is maintained by six technical personal of whom seventeen are expatriate specialists and senior administrators. In addition there are several hundred artisans and labourers employed throughout the country.
(S.W.R)

CSO: 4820

SUDAN

BRIEFS

AL-RUSAYRIS DAM--A team of consultants in the Ministry of Irrigation finalized studies pertaining to the heightening of al-Rusayris Dam. An official source in the Dam's Administration stated to the Agency that the studies had affirmed the high efficiency of the dam throughout the past 10 years. He said the World Bank had implied its support to the dam's heightening project which would start in 1981. The project is aimed at increasing the total utilization of electricity generated from the dam from 90 Kilowatt to 240 Kilowatt and to increase generation of electricity from the Sannar Dam from 15 Megawatt to 40 Megawatt, SUNA learnt. The source said the project would help in the long-run in the installation of an additional station at al-Rusayris Dam. In agriculture field, milliard cubic metres of water will be reserved for the new projects due to be set up in the Blue Nile. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 7 Oct 78 p 1]

TOBACCO PRODUCTION--Preparations are underway for the realization, within the next few years, of self-sufficiency in tobacco production, a reliable source in the Department of Horticulture told SUNA. Studies were conducted to determine new production relations among tobacco farmers in Northern and Southern Darfur, to help eliminate immigration from the production areas, the source added. On the other hand, studies are also being conducted to include the tobacco crop in the Agricultural Integration projects between Sudan and Egypt, the source concluded. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 8 Oct 78 p 2]

TRACTOR IMPORTS--The Agricultural Bank's annual import of tractors amounts to 850-1000 tractors. This covers 60% of the country's requirements. The Bank provides 70% of the farmers requirements of mechanized farming basic requirements. Following the confiscation and nationalization of agricultural equipment importing agencies, the Bank assumed the role of importer. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 8 Oct 78 p 2]

INVESTMENT DISPUTES SETTLEMENT--Sudan has ratified the agreement pertaining to the settlement of investment disputes in the countries that host Arab investment capitals. Mr 'Abd-al-Mun'im Khalifah submitted Monday the necessary documents to the Arab Economic Unity Council (AEUC). The AEUC Secretary General, Dr Fakhri Qadduri, announced that the agreement was aimed at

settling probable disputes between investors and host countries and corporations in order to create favourable conditions that would encourage investment in the Arab World. He further commended Sudan's efforts to materialize Arab economic integration and its contribution to the Arab Economic Unity Agreement, and other organizations established within the framework of the Arab Economic Unity Council. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 11 Oct 78 p 3]

OIL PROSPECTING--Khartoum, Oct 12, (SUNA)--The British Burmah Oil and the American Eastern Petroleum companies are currently negotiating on oil prospecting concessions around Tawkar delta with the Ministry of Energy and Mining. The talks cover the programme of work and the costs of prospecting and production if oil is found in commercial quantities. The British Burmah Oil Co. and the U.S. Eastern Petroleum Co. are planning to carry out work over 400 sq. kilometers south of Port Sudan. The Arab Red Sea Oil Company has earlier had preliminary negotiations to prospect for oil over 16000 sq. kilometers north of Port Sudan. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 12 Oct 78 p 1]

TRADE PROTOCOL--Minister of Trade and Supply Harun al-'Awad, was back from Peking yesterday after concluding a trade protocol with People's China and conferring with the Chinese State Council Deputy Chairman. The volume of the protocol, which will be in force for 18 months, totals 132 million dollars. People's China has also consented to purchase 45 thousand bales of cotton worth of 16 million dollars; making China's total purchases of Sudanese cotton reach 240 thousand bales worth of 68 million dollars. Commenting on his talks with the Chinese Deputy Chairman, Mr al-'Awad said the Chinese official had commended President Numayri's efforts to achieve solidarity among Afro-Arab countries as well as appreciating Sudan's developmental plans. The gratitude the Sudan felt towards the Chinese people for their tremendous aid to the Sudan and other developing countries had been communicated to the Deputy Chairman, al 'Awad stated. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 1 Oct 78 pp 1-2]

REPATRIATION OF RETURNEES--The Head of the Returnees Repatriation Committee, Mr Khalid Muhammad Ibrahim told SUNA that 450 returnees will be housed next December in model villages at the savanna belt. The villages will be linked to 4500-feddan agricultural schemes at the rate 1000 feddans for each ten persons as a first phase in a 500-thousand feddans project. The project will provide lodging for 1000 families for a total cost L.s 5.715 million. On the objectives of the repatriation project, Mr Khalid said they are aimed at adopting the modern methods in residential planning, besides the optimum agricultural and animal investment. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 1 Oct 78 p 7]

NEW EDITOR--Culture and Information Under-Secretary al-Fatih al-Tijani has been named editor-in-chief of "Sudanow" magazine as of October 1st. A resolution to this effect has been taken by Culture and Information Minister 'Ali Shummu. Ex-Culture and Information Minister Bona Malwal has until recently been assuming the office ever since publication of the magazine by the Ministry of Culture and Information in June 1976. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 3 Oct 78 p 1]

RIVER TRANSPORT--A shipping line between 'Akasha and Halfa towns will be established for transport of passengers and commodities. Egyptian steamers will be operating up to the end of 1979. The 'Akasha town, lying 120 kilometers South of Halfa, is the only outlet through which boarder trade export between Sudan and Egypt could be practised. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 4 Oct 78 p 10]

REFUGEE IDENTITY CARDS--Refugees in Sudan will shortly be provided with identity cards in compliance with article 13 of the Refugees Act and article 27 of the Geneva Refugees Charter of 1961. The Sudan News Agency said that the Ministry of Interior was now preparing the new cards, which will confine the movement of refugees to the places where the cards were issued. /Text/ /Omdurman Domestic Service in English 1545 GMT 2 Nov 78 LD/EA/

NEW FACTORY IN AL-JAZIRAH--Wad Madani, Oct. 17, (SUNA)--Some French, Belgian and Dutch firms will start early November the establishment of a textile factory on a 200,000 Sq. meters east of here. Out of the 40 million dollars over-all cost, 16 millions were allotted as a capital. The remaining sum have been secured through loans from International financing bodies beside banking facilities by the participating firms. The factory will start work with 574 workers to produce 12 million meters of coloured and dyed cloth annually. Trial operations will start on May 1980, whereby establishment work will start for 21 weeks. The ownership of the factory, undertaken by the Gezira and Managil Weaving Company will be transferred to the Gezira and Managil Cooperative Corporation six years after actual production. Several Sudanese Corporations have contributed to the Capital of the Company which has already devised a comprehensive Programme for domestic and external training programme. /Text/ /Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 17 Oct 78 p 8/

NEW ROAD--Khartourm, Oct. 18, (SUNA)--Work will start on the Sannar-Sinjah-al-Damazin road next month, a reliable source in the Public Corporation for Roads and Bridges said. The 230-kilometre road has a 50-km stretch linking Wad al-Nail with Gerabin. The project will be executed by Arab Contractors Company ('Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and Partners). The road will be financed by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Kuwait Fund. /Text/ /Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 18 Oct 78 p 3/

NEW WATER SUPPLY--Khartoum, Oct. 24, (SUNA)--The primary results of the underground water research in the Tawkar and Qash rivers Delta proved the availability of abundant amounts of water to meet the requirements of Port Sudan and Tawkar, stated an authoritative source in the Projects Preparation Unit, Planning Ministry. The Geological Department in cooperation with some West German experts are currently conducting studies to determine the amount of water as well as seeking of other sources in the area between Sawakin and Port Sudan. On the other hand studies to increase the existing water sources network in the Three Towns will be finalized in August 1979 to supply the new extentions and the expanding industries with water. Other studies for the same purpose are underway for al-'Ubayd and Kusti. The Water and Electricity Public Corporation in cooperation with the Projects Preparation Unit will prepare these studies. /Text/ /Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 24 Oct 78 p 7/

AGRICULTURAL INTEGRATION--Al-Damazin, Oct. 24, (SUNA)--Some 5,000 feddans of sesame crop are currently being harvested in the project of the Sudanese-Egyptian Agricultural Integration Company. The estimated production per feddan is expected to be 2½ sacks. The harvesting process continues for seven days. 2000 workers are engaged in the process. The Company's project, 60 km. south-east of here, with a total area of 150,000 feddans in the first stage is equally shared by the Sudan and Egypt with a capital totalling L.s 16 million. The area cultivated this year amounts to 50,000 feddans of which 35,000 surgham, 10,000 cotton 5,000 sesame and 1,500 for sunflower experiments. /Text/ /Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 24 Oct 78 p 9/

CSO: 4820

SULTANATE OF OMAN

MIDEAST 'DYNAMIC OF PEACE' SEEN GAINING MOMENTUM

Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Oct 78 p 3 LD

/Special correspondent Paul-Jean Franceschini dispatch: "Muscat leaders totally support President al-Sadat's positions" /

/Text/ Muscat--From 22 through 25 October secretary of state for foreign affairs Olivier Stirn paid a visit to Muscat where, in particular, he conveyed to Sultan Qabus an invitation from Mr Giscard d'Estaing to visit France during the second half of 1979. In addition to bilateral cooperation, the secretary of state considered the whole Near East situation with the Oman leaders. The Omani viewpoint is especially interesting in this connection since the sultanate is one of the very few Arab states to approve President al-Sadat's attitude and to have said so unequivocally.

It is believed here that there is every chance of the Steadfastness Front summit, which is supposed to follow the meeting of foreign ministers being convened 2 November in Baghdad, being postponed. The Omanis do not regard themselves as being as isolated as they appear in their support for Egyptian diplomacy, and they are obviously expressing views close to those of Saudi Arabia whose foreign minister was in Muscat as recently as Tuesday. At any rate people here are convinced that the Egyptian president's "dynamic of peace" will sooner or later gain the acquiescence of Jordan and Syria.

For its part the Sultanate of Oman wants to "defuse" the coming inter-Arab meetings and avoid "condemnation" of Mr al-Sadat. Strongly anticomunist, it has become the spokesman in the Arab world for the small "moderate" states of the Indian Ocean--Djibouti, the Seychelles and the Comoros.

In the bilateral sphere Mr Stirn's visit has imparted new impetus to cooperation, which is developing in an excellent atmosphere but remains modest in this stronghold of London interests. The French share of the market is in fact only 2.1 percent (as against 23 percent for Britain). Furthermore, a slowing of the pace has been evident for 4 years now, following the phase of development which came after the 1970 coup d'etat and the opening up to the world of a country which had been kept in the middle ages by the present sultan's father. Oman produces only 0.6 percent of the world's oil and in

this respect is behind Egypt. In 1978 it will produce less oil than last year (16.9 million tons). The establishment of an army of 20,000 men and the struggle against the Dhofar insurrection have been a heavy burden on the sultanate's finances.

Some French firms are active and are appreciated, particularly Dumez, which has constructed 33 percent of the highway network and is to receive a further contract, The Bank of Paris and the Netherlands, which has been operating since 1975, the French Oil Company and Altsholm. The Omani authorities want to develop cooperation with France and said so insistently to Mr Olivier Stirn. A cultural agreement between the two countries has been elaborated and will be signed very soon.

Finally--and this is not so very common--the small French community is unanimous in appreciating the host country and hoping that Paris takes a greater interest in it.

CSO: 4800

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

DUBAI SAID DEMANDING CHANGES IN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Manama SADA AL-USBU' in Arabic 11 Jul 78 pp 16-17

[Article by Husayn Fathallah: "Will Dampness of Summer Flood Articles of Constitution?"]

[Text] They say in the emirates that Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, the vice president of the state and the ruler of Dubai, does not engage in politics, even though he masters them. He does not receive journalists except after long contacts because he does not like clamor.

The few journalists who know Shaykh Rashid recount his famous joke when he received a journalist and then after the interview extended his hand to the journalist and said:

Give me my wages for the interview, son. You have gotten from me information worth 1,000 dinars.

This is his nature. He does not like journalists and only likes to talk to his visitors and to the citizens of his council.

They also say that Shaykh Rashid's primary concern is to develop Dubai and to transform it into a new Hong Kong.

Shaykh Rashid has realized a part of his dream. Dubai, the small emirate, has attracted the Gulf's trade and a modern civilization and structures have arisen in it--including an industrial-commercial skyscraper complex (the Rashid Commercial Center consisting of 36 floors), an enormous international airport, two moving bridges on the bay and a tunnel fitted with the latest electronic traffic equipment under the Gulf water.

Dubai has been transformed in this manner without Shaykh Rashid playing a single fils from his pocket. He brought in international firms that have built him the Rashid Port and that will collect the capital from the future "operation" of the port. He has done the same in regard to the airport, to the industrial-commercial complex and to everything.

But Shaykh Rashid, whose character is this and whose conduct has been like this, has made a short statement. However, it is a statement that indicates that the basically blazing summer of this state is going to turn into a yet hotter and more humid summer.

The ruler of Dubai has stated that he wants amendment of some of the federal constitution's articles and has said that some of these articles are unconstitutional.

He then got to the most complex point when he said that the appointment of Shaykh Sultan, the second oldest son of Shaykh Zayid, the president of the state, to the post of general commander of the armed forces is not final because it has not fulfilled the legal conditions.

The shaykhs of the seven emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, 'Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwayn, Ras al-Khaimah, al-Fujairah) agreed nearly 7 years ago on a provisional constitution for the state. In addition to this constitution, there were small "constitutions" for the separate emirates competing with the agreed-upon original constitution. Some people used these constitutions evasively to implement non-federal projects until Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan, the president of the state, threatened to resign in 1976. He did actually head for London and retreated to his private palace in Bolton.

One of the reasons Shaykh Zayid threatened to resign was the fact that the rulers of the emirates had been tampering with the provisions of the constitution, had failed to participate in the federal budget and had refused, until then, to merge their emirates in the federal state.

Shaykh Zayid's threat bore its fruit. The shaykhs held their historic meeting within the framework of the Supreme Federal Council and expressed to Shaykh Zayid their acceptance of his demands. The president of the state changed his mind about the resignation and the provisional constitution was replaced by the federal constitution.

Shaykh Rashid al-Maktum is nowadays objecting to some of the constitution's provisions, why?

It may seem to some people that the Zayid-Rashid dispute is a dispute over leadership. But those who know both men well exclude such a likelihood. When Shaykh Rashid was accused by a minister that he pays more attention to Dubai than to the federation, Shaykh Rashid answered: "Because I rule Dubai." When he was asked: Why don't you assume the presidency? He said: "I don't like titles without powers."

This took place in the presence of Shaykh Zayid who said: "You are the vice president of the state." Shaykh Rashid answered: "Only in name and not in fact."

Shaykh Zayid was sincere when he offered, on a different occasion, the presidency to Shaykh Rashid. But the ruler of Dubai said: "You are the only one fit for it."

This does not explain the contradiction in Shaykh Rashid's actions. The disagreement fundamentally is not over the leadership. Shaykh Rashid is content with his role in the federation as vice president of the state. But he wants greater economic freedom. The situation in the emirates, according to some people, is exposed to an economic blockade. Before World War II, there wasn't a single Arab merchant in Dubai, whereas the situation is now different. Now almost two-thirds the merchants are Arabs.

It has also been said that a decision was issued by Abu Dhabi banning transit movement for fear of infiltrators. But Dubai believes that it is one of the most disciplined emirates insofar as wiping out this phenomenon is concerned. It asks Abu Dhabi whether any infiltrators have come to it from Dubai, and adds that it does not grant passports to such infiltrators, assuming they are present. It also gives them no land.

Shaykh Rashid says that the appointment of the general commander is not valid because the Council of Ministers has not adopted a decision on the appointment. Dubai has its weight in this council, whereas Abu Dhabi's strong influence diminishes in it.

Consequently, the problem will not be solved, they say in Dubai, except by repealing the decree appointing the general commander and by amending some of the constitution's provisions which obstruct the progress of some of the poor emirates.

Shaykh Zayid faces this time more than one obstacle and one issue:

He is required to spend on Jabal 'Ali Port, the most important port in the area altogether, which was begun by Shaykh Rashid in the hope that Shaykh Zayid would pay its costs in full.

He is required to rescue the Emirate of Sharjah which has expanded its projects to the degree where it is now indebted by 500 million dollars to some banks.

He is also required to solve Ras al-Khaimah's problem with the Sultanate of Oman.

There are numerous demands and enormous burdens. Shaykh Zayid, who has paid a lot in terms of his health and from his own money to strengthen the federal branch, now finds himself as if starting anew.

Though the disagreement reflects the negative aspects of the federation, all the rulers of the emirates attest to the pure Arabism of Shaykh Zayid and to his love for unity and the federation. This alone is enough, in the absence of the complexes of personal leadership, to make the federation's sun gentle this year, contrary to what has been expected by those concerned with the federation's affairs and future.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

TERRORIST CARLOS EXPECTED TO ENTER COUNTRY IN NEXT TWO DAYS

Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 13 Jul 78 p 15

[Text] Abu Dhabi--KUNA--The UAE security agencies distributed yesterday a picture which they said was that of Carlos who led the operation against the OPEC ministers [in Vienna] and distributed a detailed description of his personal appearance and characteristics to the hotels, establishments and companies.

These agencies asked that they be informed immediately of any suspect bearing close resemblance to the picture.

Citing reliable sources, the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY has said that information was received by Abu Dhabi authorities indicating that it is likely that Carlos will enter the UAE in the next 2 days. The agency has also said that it is being said that Carlos entered the UAE three times recently, but that this has not been confirmed.

8494
CSO: 4802

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

NEW FEDERAL BUDGET ANALYZED; CUTBACKS NOTED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22 Jul 78 p 20

[Article: "Analysis of New UAE Budget; Abu Dhabi Guarantees Two-Thirds of Budget; Relative Decline Covers all Utilities"]

[Text] Currency fluctuations and the political problems that swept the UAE in the spring and summer of last year did not disappear with the return of economic and currency resurgence in each of the emirates separately as of the beginning of the current year. The oil revenues freeze expected this year does not alone justify the decline recorded by the new federal budget and amounting to more than 20 percent at both levels of federal revenues and spending.

Whereas the 1977 fiscal year budget amounted to 13 billion dirhams (representing the contributions of the various emirates toward the federal government), the new budget indicates that revenues in the current fiscal year will amount to nearly 10.29 billion dirhams.

Lion's Share

Perhaps it is useful to point out that the lion's share of these contributions comes from Abu Dhabi which alone covers two-thirds the federal budget.

It is natural that the general cutback in the budget is reflected in all the clauses forming this budget. Some of the federal ministries will experience a noticeable cutback whereas the resources of other federal ministries are supposed to increase. Because of its importance, we find that the resources of the federal Ministry of Finance and Industry increase by about 77 percent from 66.55 million dirhams in 1977 to 117.50 million dirhams in the current year. This signifies two things: First, an expected rise in the value of collected taxes and, second, an increase in the revenues of the federal government-owned industries. Ranked second in regard to increase of resources is the Ministry of Public Works and Housing whose resources will increase by 6 percent from 32 million dirhams last year to 34 million dirhams this year. Then comes the Ministry of Justice, Islamic and Awqaf

Affairs whose resources will increase by about one-third from 12.9 million dirhams to 16.89 million dirhams this year.

On the other hand, the revenues of the other federal ministries will experience cutbacks. The resources of the Ministry of Labor will drop to 2 million dirhams (compared to 2.5 million last year), those of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries will shrink from 15 million dirhams to 12.7 million dirhams this year, the resources of the federal Ministry of the Interior will decline from 7.25 million dirhams to 6.68 million dirhams and those of the Ministry of Information and Culture will decline from 3.3 million dirhams to 3 million dirhams.

Restricted Spending

As for restricted spending, it will include all sections, but by varying degrees. The biggest reduction will be in the development budget whose expenditures constitute 12.84 percent of the total federal spending budget. This budget includes two chapters: The current expenditures, which absorb nearly three-fourths the total spending, and the development expenditures, which absorbs nearly one-fourth the general spending.

The level of this spending in the new budget reaches the level of the federal revenues, i.e. 10.5 billion dirhams that are divided into: 7.59 billion dirhams for the current expenditures budget and 2.9 billion dirhams for development spending. The allocations of the federal Ministry of Defense absorb 3 billion dirhams or nearly 40 percent of the total current spending budget, whereas the remaining 60 percent of the budget is shared by the remaining five ministries which are, according to importance: The Ministry of Education and Culture [sic] (914.9 dirhams), the Ministry of Public Health (640.1 million dirhams), the Ministry of the Interior (554.6 million dirhams) and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (287.6 million dirhams).

Development Concerns

The federal budget's appropriations for development spending, amounting to 2.9 billion dirhams, are divided into two parts: The First including 1.5099 billion dirhams representing the development appropriations for all the ministries, excluding the Ministry of Finance and Industry which comes under the second part that includes 1.3096 billion dirhams. The appropriations included in the first part are divided according to importance between: The Ministry of Education and Culture (389.4 million dirhams), the Ministry of Electricity and Water Resources (256.4 million dirhams), the Ministry of Communications (25-.21 million dirhams), the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (247.1 million dirhams) and the Ministry of the Interior (107.3 million dirhams). The second part includes the development appropriations for the Ministry of Finance and Industry, amounting to 9.04 million dirhams, and the UAE foreign investments budget.

The foreign investments budget will drop by nearly 30 percent this year compared to last year, from 1.8443 billion dirhams to 1.3305 billion dirhams. But this decline is at the level of the sum total whereas details of the budget show that a large part of the investment has remained the same as it was last year and that another part has registered some increase, considering that the new budget calls for increasing the UAE participation in the IMF from 100 to 125 million dollars this year, increasing the UAE investments in the Arab Industrial Investments Company from 4.1 million dirhams to 4.2 million dirhams, the UAE share in the capital of the Arab Bank for African Development from 20 to 26.6 million dirhams and its participation in the Gulf Organization for Egyptian Development from 240 to 330 million dirhams. This last increase was confirmed 3 weeks ago when the Advisory Committee on Egypt agreed at its meeting in the French capital to renew the loans to Egypt by the same sum which Egypt had acquired last year.

Foreign Investments

The foreign investments budget stipulates that the UAE pay its share of 27.7 million dirhams toward the capital of the Arab Mining Company, to increase its share in the Arab Livestock Resources Development Company from 20.1 million dirhams to 28 million dirhams, to increase its share in the Arab Drug and Medical Equipment Company from 1.7 million dirhams to 22.16 million dirhams and to pay 25 million dirhams to finance the joint international communication projects with the other Gulf countries.

In addition to these increases, the foreign investments budget calls for maintaining the volume of foreign investments this year as it was last year. In this regard, the UAE share deposited with the World Bank will continue to be 41.1 million dirhams. Moreover, the volume of the UAE participated in the resources of the International Development Association [sic] will not change and will remain as it is at present, i.e. within the limits of 20 million dirhams. Moreover, the volume of its participation in the resources of the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund will not increase. Its participation in the fund this year will amount to 25.9 million dirhams compared to 25.3 million dirhams last year. The UAE participation in the Islamic Development Bank will also remain within the limits of 100 million dirhams, the same as last year.

The same applies to the UAE participation in the Gulf Commercial Bank's capital because its share will continue to be within the limits of 6 million dirhams. Meanwhile, the UAE share in the Arab Petroleum Services Company will increase slightly, from 14.28 million dirhams to 14.7 million dirhams.

As for the spheres in which the UAE investments will decline, the most prominent is the Arab Industrialization Organization which includes the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt and which was founded originally with the participation of a number of French and British firms to manufacture weapons in the Arab world. The new UAE investments budget stipulates that the appropriations for this organization in the current year will amount to 284 million dirhams, i.e. less than one half what the UAE contributed last year when

it appropriated 490 million dirhams. The main reason for this decline is that the organization has completed formation of its capital and has begun the first phase of actual production. This is why the participation of the member countries from now on will only include financing the ordinary current agreements. The UAE share in the resources of the International Financial Organization will also decline from 20 million dirhams to 3.14 million dirhams this year. The UAE participation in the Arab Agricultural Development Authority will also decline to 37.2 million dirhams compared to 42 million dirhams last year. Its share in the Arab Maritime Company for Petroleum Transportation will also drop from 81.2 million dirhams to 37 million dirhams. However, what draws attention is that the UAE participation in the special OPEC Fund will drop at once from 99 million dirhams to 2.05 million dirhams only. This in itself heralds a continued freeze in the volume of the UAE revenues from oil exports, and this freeze will be reflected in the volume of the money surpluses that can be employed abroad.

Conclusion: Tightfistedness

What can be concluded from these figures is, first, that the period of excessive spending at the federal level has ended, and that this spending has begun to take a more rational character than in the past 4 years. Moreover, the decline in the federal resources reflects automatically a decline in the contributions of the Abu Dhabi Emirate which wants the other Arab emirates, especially Dubai, to shoulder a bigger share of the federal financial burdens. This reflects in its turn Abu Dhabi's dissatisfaction with Dubai's failure to submit to the federal necessities in its projects which are often in conflict with the federal requirements and which at times constitute some sort of economic waste. The issue of the Dubai drydock is one of the examples of this waste. Regardless of the multiplicity of reasons, the cutback in the federal budget indicates that the UAE is about to enter a new phase of its economic life.

8494
CSO: 4802

END